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BOOK IV

Chapter i

Is it the responsibility of the student of politics to describe the best species of the republic, its differentiations, powers and laws, even if such a species can never exist?

T this point those interpreters who assert that in this and the ensuing Books Aristotle dealt with trifles incur a just reprehension. Certainly (if I have any wit regarding political precepts, and I know how slight it is) I think that he shuns trifles, being a man who strives to write and demonstrate concerning matters of the greatest weight, since now he exposes the hidden places of the commonwealth and, as it were, divulges the secrets and mysteries of republics, by explaining the kinds, forms, powers, conditions, and laws of each constitution and administration. Therefore I have applied myself to this study (as they say) with might and main, that, just as in his previous Books, so too in these the Philosopher may address us eloquently. For my part I am aware and cheerfully acknowledge that many of the precepts in these Books are wrapped in dark shadows. I am likewise aware that he is deeply involved in one thing for a long time, and that there is obscurity on the one hand and tedium ong the other. But in fair things love of knowledge will remove the obscurity, and the effort of study will do away with the tedium. Yet I shall exert myself that this might come to pass, that both will be diminished both by the light of interpretation and the variety of the manifold questions.
2. But now I pass to an explication of the Philosopher, who, after dividing the republic into the correct and the incorrect, set forth the species of both kinds abundantly enough, and now comes to the enunciation of other forms. And, to be frank, this Book is divided into four parts, of which the first contains a division of republics according to their kind, the second their individual parts and their divisions, the third the best form of them all, and the fourth the powers necessary in every republic, namely those of consultation, judgment, and governing. In this first chapter the Philosopher shows what things are to be weighed by the student of politics in the civil science, whence is derived this question I have raised, whether it is business of the student of politics to describe the best species of the republic, their differentiations, powers and laws, even if such a republic can never exist. In treating this question, having progressed from a thesis to a hypothesis, Aristotle first shows this to be requisite in every science, that it must discuss not just its common object but that which is simply the best, from which he infers that it is needful in this science also to investigate not just what the republic is commonly, but what republic is simply excellent. His general reasoning is as follows. All the arts which involve a common subject must consider what is best and what is suitable for each individual case, civil science (the noblest of all the arts) is concerned with a common subject, therefore civil science must consider what is best and what can be accommodated to each individual case. In this reasoning, by “the best” the Philosopher understands the perfection of each art by means of the powers and properties which pertain to each thing demonstrated concerning its subject. For example, in this science the subject is the commonwealth, its perfection is the best republic, towards which all men strive as towards a goal, and its properties are consultation, hearing cases, judgment, the performance of magistracies, and the other similar things which ornament the commonwealth and bring it to completion. In the text Aristotle proves this by two comparisons, since, just as it belongs to the gymnastic art not only to consider what is the best exercise of the body, but also what kind of exercise suits each individual, and just as it belongs to medicine not only to teach what is the best constitution of Man, but what kind of constitution can be adapted for each individual, so it belongs to political science not only to describe the best republic, but to demonstrate with exactitude the powers, laws, properties, and all the other things which pertain to all republics. And, although such a republic should never appear on this earth perfected in all its numbers, it nevertheless should be sagely delineated by philosophers, which I prove with the following arguments, taken in part from Aristotle and in part from others.
3. The first is from things compared. For just as in their contemplation of nature philosophers discuss, not inappropriately, an equality of weight and a mixture of elements that is perfect in every respect, and as physicians dispute acutely of a wonderful harmony and balanced mixture of the humors which never exists in a human body, thus students of politics and wise men give us precepts about the loftiest and most perfect form of the commonwealth, although one of this kind is never visible and never comes to light. But just as these two types of philosopher place these most exact means before their eyes for this purpose, that they might better understand how great a deviation from the mean exists, thus students of politics describe this form of republic so they might better perceive the administration of the commonwealth. And certainly this is not absurd: quite to the contrary, it is useful and profitable, since once upon a time the most wise and learned men did this selfsame thing. For otherwise, what did Cicero mean when he described for our benefit the excellent orator? What did Plato intend when he constructed such a divine idea of his republic? What did More have in his mind when he published his learned little book about Utopia, if things placed beyond our human lot and powers do not invite us to the norm of mediocrity? The most expert archers do not always hit the target with their arrows, it is enough if sometimes they find their mark. Thus, surely, the most erudite men propose this distinguished form of the commonwealth so that, as if sighting their target, by day and by night with all their powers they might turn their fellow citizens to the highest. Therefore, in the way that mathematicians describe an nonexistent indivisible point so that all lines may be drawn to it from a circumference, thus students of politics define a certain most divine form of nonexistent republic, so that, insofar as is possible, all the footsteps of their fellow citizens may be directed thither. Add to this that God Almighty has given us His laws thus, that we cannot satisfy them with our own abilities. It is therefore not absurd sometimes to propose those things which cannot readily be achieved and acquired, especially if in such proposals is hidden an attractive magnet, that is, if there is a great power in them by which, as if by the hand of virtue, we are led straightway to lofty heights. Finally, nobody can say or demonstrate in a few words what great advantage it is to the republic if this same thing occurs. Let this one thing suffice, that, with the form of such a commonwealth having been described, many men should pursue virtue more keenly, and accommodate themselves to the common good. The praise of Achilles inspired great Alexander to the pursuit of fortitude, but the form of virtue should inspire us much more to the study of the commonwealth.
4. But it is not enough for the political man to describe this form of republic, he must add powers, customs, properties, offices, and laws. Therefore in the text the Philosopher continues and refutes those who have only described the best or the common form of the republic For he says it is insufficient to know what is simply be best; one must also understand what one is good, indeed one must know what one is good conditionally and (if I may say so) by supposition. Finally, one must know it has been constituted from its beginning, how long it is been preserved, and with what laws it has been equipped. All these things, I say, the student of politics must know. If you ask the reasons for these things, they follow in the text. First the forms of the commonwealth are to be investigated, otherwise it is completely impossible to understand how one administration differs from another. Again, if the student of politics should ignore the laws (which are the sinews of the commonwealth) how can he justly prescribe a form of administration according to laws? If he does not assiduously and industriously consider the people’s customs, what manner of laws, what orders, what customs and moral precepts can he give? If he should neglect duties, dignities, judgments, consultations, and the other powers and properties of the commonwealth, by what means can he either found the republic aright or, should it already be founded, long preserve it from destruction and shipwreck? Therefore for the man who strives to be a political man, it is worthwhile to understand all these things distinctly and accurately, for otherwise he, himself erring, wrecks the ship of state, perilously run upon the reefs. And if he has done this, it will be no easy matter to bring the flotsam of the shattered commonwealth safely into port, since (as Aristotle says here), it is no less effort or trouble to correct the form of administering the republic than to found one in the first place. If these things are true (as they are most true) how great is the unconcern of our times, in which many men, blinder than a woodworm, perform civil magistracies, who, no different than mute statues, sit on benches in the most ample commonwealths, voiceless, lifeless, motionless? I understand that bakers, tavern-keepers, cobblers, and other men of the basest sort, fattened with filthy lucre, sometimes occupy the places of magistrates in their city. Such men dispute better about ale-cups than laws, more fitly about Aesop’s fables than the tables and statutes of the commonwealth. Why say more? The captain’s ignorance wrecks the ship, the magistrate’s folly ruins the commonwealth.

THE DISTINCTION OF THE QUESTION

5. OBJECTION Disputation about a nonentity is pointless, the outstandingly good commonwealth that never exists is a nonentity, therefore this disputation is pointless. The major premise is proven, since every question has a subject-matter. The minor is proven, since such a republic does not exist, and a nonentity is that which does not exist, therefore such a republic is a nonentity.
RESPONSE First, your major premise is refused. The reason is that dispute about a nonentity is sometimes useful, as about infinity, a vacuum, and the negation of contradictories. This happens either when a nonentity is defended in lieu of an entity, or so that an entity (the opposite of a nonentity) is better understood by a comparison of opposites. To your minor premise I say that a simply good republic is not a nonentity, although it indeed does not exist in actuality. The cause that it does not exist is Man’s corruption, not a defect in the essence of the commonwealth itself. For example, it is does not follow if you argue in this way: in this life there is no immortality because of Man’s fall, therefore immortality does not exist. So it does not hold if you likewise say there is no absolutely perfect commonwealth because of Man’s imperfection, therefore the perfect commonwealth does not exist.
OBJECTION An expectation that bears no fruit is pointless, therefore the contemplation of such a commonwealth, which bears no fruit, is pointless. The reason is that such contemplation engenders tedium, wearies citizens’ minds, indeed urges them into despair of achieving this end.
RESPONSE Nature is not wearied even if she does not discern the simply best temperament. The archer does not abandon all hope, even if he does not hit is mark. Likewise the earnest citizen places this form before his eyes as the best temperament and a sign of the excellent commonwealth, directs all his actions towards it, conforms his habits, orders his life, and although, tossed about by various misfortunes, does not attain it, nevertheless in this way to appear the best he can. Therefore in citizens’ minds this contemplation creates eagerness rather than tedium, great hope of virtue rather than despair.
OBJECTION Political science is universal, as the Philosopher teaches in this context, the science of the laws (as in ethics) investigates men’s particular actions, therefore this science does not handle laws.
RESPONSE Political science is considered in two ways, either with respect to its theorems and the precepts that it gives us, and thus it is universal and demonstrative, or with respect to the action and use of the commonwealth, and thus it accommodates universal precepts to citizens’ morals, as the physician accommodates medicines to men’s diseases. Accepted in either way, it must consider laws, viz. generally, by demonstrating the best, and specifically by preserving the good and the common.
6. OBJECTION It is the province of the jurisprudent to consider laws and the differentiations of laws, therefore this does not pertain to the student of politics. The argument is proven, since jurisprudence and political science are distinct arts having different tasks.
RESPONSE Jurisprudence and political science are cognate and placed hierarchically. Therefore the interpreters reply that consideration of laws pertains to the political student definitively, but to the jurisprudent positively. The reason is that as a function of his office the former demonstrates how established law agree with the first causes and principles of the laws, but the latter promulgates and executes them.
OBJECTION To consider all the circumstances of laws and republics requires long experience, political science requires no experience, therefore should not consider all the circumstances of laws and republics. The major premise is agreed, since the circumstances of laws and republics are located in men’s actions and morals. The minor is likewise evident, since political science is not concerned with particulars, as the Philosopher teaches by a comparison of this science with other arts at the beginning of this chapter.
RESPONSE The circumstances of laws and republics can be considered in two ways, either in accordance with the prescription of the art, and thus the student of politics considers them, or according to the act of justice and equity, and thus he does not handle them. Yet he accommodates his contemplation to men’s particular actions and morals, not according to experience, which he does not always seek, but according to the understanding of affairs he possesses. Therefore I reply that it is necessary that the political man should consider circumstances of laws and republics with respect to the prescription of reason, though it is not always necessary that he consider them with respect to the execution of equity, which he leaves to the magistrates of the commonwealth exclusively; that is (as I have already shown), all these things pertain to the political student for definitive consideration, and to the magistrate for positive consideration.

THE CHAPTER’S DOUBTFUL QUESTION
Is it more difficult to correct a depraved republic than to found a new one in the first place?

7. In olden times the distinguished musician Timotheus is said to have demanded a double fee from many men to whom he taught his art, one for teaching them forgetfulness of the things they had learned badly, and another for filling their minds with his correct science. This prudent gentleman appreciate that it is no less laborious to unlearn bad precepts than to learn the precepts of the art properly. As it is in art, so it is in the commonwealth, which is much harder to correct when depraved than to erect a new one from its foundations, since if custom (be it good or bad) is a second nature, if the citizens’ depraved habituation sinks deep roots, it is not only an arduous task but also a perilous one to rip out all its fibers and change the people’s morals. For, just as it is easy to bend a green plant upright, but not when it is grown lofty, so a recently-founded commonwealth can be molded to virtue by good laws, but one accustomed to bad morals sets aside its iniquitous custom very rarely, if at all. He who wants a building to be sturdy must make his beginning from a very firm foundation. Thus he who would wish to institute a correct commonwealth will have to have regard for the first beginnings and, as it were, the seeds of its morals. For otherwise, as it no less labor to repair an ill-constructed house than to build one, so the reformation of the commonwealth requires no less industry than its construction de novo. Once the Roman Republic, wisely founded, grew and long flourished, but, made a popular state by the license of its tribunes, could not by any industry be recalled to its pristine form of administration. It was a great burden to found the Roman nation, sbut a greater one to preserve it when it had fallen. Thus it is easy for a political man to bring a newborn republic to a polished state, but it is a great and quite difficult task to raise up one that has fallen. In sum, it is deemed more laborious to unlearn precepts taught badly than to learn ones taught well, therefore it is more difficult to correct a depraved republic than to found one in the first place. Thus Aristotle in the text. Again, it is far most difficult to set aside a bad custom, therefore it is laborious to correct a depraved commonwealth. Then too, a change of laws in the commonwealth is risky, therefore a change of morals is considerably more so. Furthermore, it is easier to raise a house from its foundations than to repair a tumbledown one, therefore it is more difficult to mend a bad republic than to found a new one. The example of the Roman commonwealth proves this very thing, which did not reflower after having fallen, and so does the similitude of health which, when once infirm, is not easily restored.

THE DISTINCTION

8. OBJECTION Correction or emendation involves a few things, but construction involves all things, therefore it is not more difficult to correct a depraved republic than to found a new one. The antecedent is clear from the interpretation of the things which are corrected and constructed de novo. The reasoning follows, since it is easier to bring a few things to order than many.
RESPONSE The difficulty is not in respect to the paucity of things, but in respect to the perversity in men, who are loaded down by habit more than by a heavy weight. Therefore, albeit construction involves all things, but correction only a few, yet inasmuch as in the former the propensity of the citizens is towards the good, but in the latter exists their depravation, I maintain the latter is far harder.
OBJECTION It is more difficult to make an entity out of a nonentity than to restore a declining entity, to construct a republic de novo is to make an entity out of a nonentity, but to correct one is only to restore a declining republic, therefore it is more difficult to construct a republic de novo than to correct and emend one that is depraved. The major premise is agreed, since generation is a more difficult work of nature than alteration. The minor is proven, since to construct a republic de novo is to engender a new one, but to correct one is only to alter.
RESPONSE Generation is no more difficult a work of nature than alteration, if you consider nature’s force and power. The reason is that nature is no less efficacious in acquiring internal forms of things than in acquiring external ones. Therefore I reply that this argument does not hold by comparison, indeed I maintain that the depravation of the republic is not only an alteration but rather a corruption of the republic. And, just as it is impossible for a physician to restore a dead man to life, thus it is most difficult for a politician to recall a corrupt republic to a correct form of administration.

Chapter ii

Is tyranny the worst among the faults of the republic?

HIS chapter consists of three elements, namely of a description of tyranny, a criticism of Plato, and a demonstration of the order in which the Philosopher will follow in his ensuing precepts. But before he comes to the description of tyranny, in a few words his repeats the division of the republic into the correct and incorrect, and shows that he has specified three forms of the correct republic and the like number of incorrect ones, which are called faults and transgressions of the commonwealth. The correct consist of kingship, the government of the best men, and that which is commonly called by the name of republic or polity, and the incorrect consists of tyranny, the power of the few, and timocracy, into which the three aforementioned ones fall when they collapse. For the collapse of kingship turns into tyranny, the fall of aristocracy into oligarchy, and the ruin of the polity into popular madness, and their conversion is again recalled to those three better constitutions and forms of administration. Thus the times, governments, and constitutions of the republic have their vicissitudes and transformations, human power ebbs and flows, now rising high, now being turned into ashes. Thus nature turns her wheels, thus Man’s prudence takes a fall.
2. But these things will become apparent in the following Book, where the transformations of republics are treated. Now follows a description of tyranny and its comparison with the other forms of administration, whence this question which I am now handling is raised, whether tyranny is by far the worst among all the faults of the republic. In this context Aristotle maintains it is the worst, and thus proves it with an argument taken from opposites. That which is opposite to the best is itself the worst, tyranny is the opposite of the best form of administration, therefore tyranny is the worst. The proposition holds from the place of contraries,whose nature is to be opposite. The assumption is proven, since tyranny is the bane of monarchy, by far the noblest of all administrations. For monarchy is a blessed constitution of the commonwealth, tyranny is the commonwealth’s fault and misery. In monarchy there is a king, either chosen in council or admitted by succession, but in tyranny there is a brutal lion. In monarchy virtue is advanced, crime triumphs in tyranny. In monarchy the laws speak openly, but in tyranny the oracles of the commonwealth fall silent. In a kingship one strives for the common good, but in tyranny the people is oppressed. Why say more? These two are opposed to each other in every respect, therefore, with monarchy being the best, it is necessary that tyranny be deemed the worst. So much from Aristotle generally, now I prove this same thing from his commentators, and first from the instinct of nature, which abhors and detests tyranny as a monstrosity. One can see this in many things, but most of all in murderers, who quake and flee nature’s finger and denunciation. Who, pray, does not know that the dead man sheds blood in the presence of his murderer? But I ask the cause of this blood being shed: surely you can give no other than God and nature, who in this way betray the murderer and the tyrant. In this way the sheep curse the wolf, the four-foot beasts the lion, the birds the eagle, the sea-nettles the hatchet, all nature hateful tyranny and cruelty, which it flees as being most dangerous and inimical to itself. Tyranny is therefore most hateful both to nature and the commonwealth. For (if I may dispute from effects) what manner of commonwealth is it in which the tyrant rules? Within it is there not the oppression of the multitude, the effusion of blood, the confusion of order, the violation of laws, the perturbation of all things? Pompey’s head scarce pleased Caesar, Cicero’s head did not sate Antony’s rage, the heads of thirty senators were offered Marius as a first course, Nero killed his preceptor Seneca, and (horrible to say) mangled his mother’s guts. The tyrannical tragedy contains these acts, these scenes. Woe to the commonwealth in which the tyrant reigns!
3. Pray what, to continue, is more hateful to human nature than savage and bestial cruelty? In Man reason rather than frenzy, mildness rather than monstrosity holds sway according the force of nature. So how much of a decline from nature is there when a lion is made out of a man, a tyrant out of a mild man? Tyranny, therefore, is not only contrary to nature generically, but is also contrary to reason, in which our human essence is perceived the most. If I were to represent here before your eyes the ruin of the many commonwealths which have collapsed, stricken by the lightning bolt of tyranny, the tears of the ages, the mourning-garments of our ancestors, the words and shouts of many commonwealths would declare that this constitution of the republic is the most accursed. As witnesses to this thing stand all the histories which have described for us tyrants like Dionysius, Phalaris, Nero, Heliogabalus, and other monsters of this world I shall say nothing here about sacred philosophy and divine laws, which frequently commemorate Antiochus, Herod, and other brutal men of blood. I shall conclude with a word, tyranny is like a viper conceived in the womb of the commonwealth, for, just as a viper cannot be born without the bursting of its mother, so tyranny does not exist without the ruin and destruction of the commonwealth. Therefore tyranny is the worst of all administrations, be it compared with the good forms of the republic or with the bad. When I say it is the worst I mean that in depravity and danger it surpasses the power of the few and the madness and fury of the people.
4. Hence occurs the second thing handled in this chapter, namely an insinuated criticism of Plato, used to say that popular administration was the worst if it is compared to the correct forms, but the best if compared with the incorrect ones, as if he were say that it is the worst of the correct administrations, although none of these are bad, and the best of the incorrect ones, although none of these are good. For all the correct republics are good although each has its own degree of perfection, and all the incorrect ones are called bad, even if in a comparison between one these and another some one is deemed to be worse and inferior to another of the same kind. The third thing treated here is the demonstration of the order which Aristotle proposed for setting forth his ensuing precepts. First, he says, we must distinguish what are the differentiating features of republics, then we must determine what republic is most common and most to be sought,other than that one I have described as the best. In this context by “best” he means not just monarchy, but also aristocracy, since these two forms of administration are governed by the same law of virtue, and are referred to the same good of the commonwealth. With these things set forth, he says, we must see what government suits each people and commonwealth, and what sort of man he must be who presides over the others. Finally, when a brief and lucid discussion of all these things has been given, we must strive to delineate exactly and to the life the causes that overthrow and preserve republics. When these things are understood, administration will be much safer in any constitution of the republic you care to mention. Finally, lest the standing crop of the commonwealth be neglected, it must be shown with what arts and morals the youth should be inculcated, in which grows the flower of the republic, and the hope of the future commonwealth emerges.

THE DISTINCTION

 

5. OBJECTION Whatever is sometimes useful and necessary in the commonwealth is not altogether the worst, tyranny is sometimes useful and necessary in the commonwealth, therefore tyranny is not the worst. The major premise is proven, since the useful is conjoined to the honorable, the necessary to virtue. The minor is proven, since when civil sedition goes a-rioting dictatorship is necessary, and this is nothing other than an approved tyranny, as the Roman laws once defined it.
RESPONSE Tyranny is never useful or necessary, not even when intestine civil sedition is raging, nor is dictatorship a violent tyranny, but rather a voluntary, just, and approved severity. But that dictatorship is called tyranny, this comes about because during the storm of sedition the dictator has the power of life and death, and during so great a tempest of the republic he controls all things according to his will and not according to the laws. Yet it differs from tyranny in this respect, that the former drags only bad and seditious men to the place of execution, but the latter does so to good and earnest men.
OBJECTION Oligarchy and timocracy are worse than tyranny, therefore tyranny is not the worst. The antecedent is proven, since those constitution are worst in which rule more tyrants than just a single one, there are more tyrants in oligarchy and timocracy, but only one in tyranny, therefore oligarchy and timocracy are worst than tyranny. The minor premise of this syllogism is obvious, since in oligarchy the furor of a few, in timocracy the madness and frenzy of the entire people hold sway.
RESPONSE Just as aristocracy and democracy are not better forms of the republic than monarchy since in them a number of men rule justly and earnestly, but in monarchy only one, so oligarchy and timocracy are not worse constitutions of the commonwealth than is tyranny, even if them a number of men possess the government by seizure and according to their arbitrary will. The reason is that in monarchy the force of the virtues is united, but dispersed in the others, and so within tyranny is the contagion of all the vices, which in the other incorrect forms of administration is more dissipated.
OBJECTION Whatever administration most harms the commonwealth is the worst of all, but the raging administration of the people most harms the commonwealth, therefore the raging administration of the people is the worst of all. The minor premise is proven, since there is a greater force of tyranny in the raging administration of the people, and an impulse greater than the multitude’s reason, which, harmonizing them universally, shatters and destroys the commonwealth.
RESPONSE This argument is drawn from a false supposition, for there is no such administration at all in which the whole multitude rages universally and collectively. Timocracy or the maladministration of the people is one in which which the keys of the republic are entrusted to supporters and tribunes of the people, but in these men the force of tyranny is more dissipated than if everything were permitted to a single Nero.
OBJECTION Whatever is legitimate is not the worst, tyranny is legitimate, therefore tyranny is not the worst. The minor premise is proven, since, as certain men rightly define it, the king is God’s right hand, the tyrant His left. For the one is aid to be God’s instrument of mercy, the other that of His justice, God’s justice is legitimate, therefore its instrument, which is sometimes the tyrant, possess just and legitimate authority.
RESPONSE In this context two things are to be considered, divine permission and divine approval. God often permits tyrants to reign, but He does not approve their rule: he allowed Cain to kill Abel, Pharoah to persecute His own people, but He branded Cain a reprobate and drowned Pharoah in the savage floods. But that tyranny is sometimes said to be God’s left hand or instrument does not argue that it is just, but rather that the punishment God inflicts on the commonwealth is legitimate.

THE CHAPTER’S DOUBTFUL QUESTION
Is it better to conceal faults of the republic from the people than to have them pointed out by the student of politics?

6. Aristotle affirms in the text that he must not only say what are the correct forms of administrating the republic, but also what its faults and blemishes are. I am not sure whether this decision of the Philosopher more helps or harms the people, who are often captured by an awareness of bad things not otherwise than a fish by bait and hook. In my opinion Ovid would have done better to have kept his Art of Love concealed than to have written it, that Albertus very shamefully unveiled women’s secrets, Caesar was considered more pious for covering his privy parts with his hand when he had been miserably stabbed, Apelles blushed when he painted Venus. Therefore it seems better to expunge the blemishes of the commonwealth with the pen of silence than to express them in a lifelike way with the philosopher’s pencil. But I am only being playful, the matter is indeed quite otherwise. For, as the proverb has it, evils appreciated are more easily avoided, missiles foreseen strike less hard. If the people should be caught like a fish by a recitation of these bad things, the fault is Man’s, not the writers. For bees suck honey and wax from the same flowers whence toads get their venom. Therefore the faults and blemishes of the commonwealth must be described, first of all so the correct forms of administration may thus shine the brighter. For, as the philosophers teach, when opposites are placed beside each other they are more visible, and so with tyranny having been described monarchy seems more august, with the fury of the multitude having been described the polity seems more blessed. Second, this advantage arises from that description, that the commonwealth is rendered more just and cautious. For with these evils demonstrated it more rarely stumbles and falls. Third, just as in the contemplation of nature not only the forms, powers and motions of things but also monstrosities are described, and as in medical speculation not only wholesome herbs but also poisons are described, thus in civil administration not only the virtues, but also the faults and plagues of the republic must be outlined. Finally, with these monstrosities of the commonwealth well appreciated, the onslaught of tyrants is easily repelled, and their injuries, frauds and wiles are more readily avoided. Therefore, just as philosophers describe monstrosities, physicians describe poisons, cosmographers describe the great perils of earth and sea lest they do harm, so Aristotle demonstrated the faults and plagues of the republic lest, infected by these, commonwealths might perish.

THE DISTINCTION

 

7. OBJECTION In a well-administered republic not only evils but the causes of evils should be removed insofar as is possible, descriptions of the faults of the commonwealth are causes of evils, therefore the faults of the commonwealth are not to be described. The major premise is agreed, since justice is the foundation of the commonwealth. The minor is proven by a comparison. For just as statues of Venus and stories about Cupid corrupt the youth, so descriptions of the faults and transgressions of the republic corrupt the commonwealth. Wherefore, just as, according to the Philosopher, those things are to be kept from their eyes and ears lest they harm youth, so we ought to conceal these so they do not destroy the commonwealth.
RESPONSE Descriptions of faults are causes of evils received, not given, since in their description the student of politics aims at the good of the commonwealth, not its harm. Therefore if felonious citizens bring forth scorpion’s eggs, and hatch little would-be kings hissing against their nation, they themselves are indeed monsters, for they contain the cause of evil within themselves. As the Philosopher says, your argument from a similarity teaches rightly, but does not lead to your conclusion in every respect and absolutely. For even if statues of Venus and tales of Cupid sometimes corrupt youth by means of their eyes and ears, yet it does not follow that descriptions of faults infect the commonwealth. The reason is, that within the former lie affection and lust, but in the latter reign reason and prudence.
OBJECTION The misdeeds of the king should be dissimulated and concealed, therefore the faults of the commonwealth should not be pointed out. The antecedent is obvious, since, if the king’s felonies should become manifest, the contagion will quickly spread to the hearts of the people, since the whole world conforms itself to the king’s example. The argument is proven, since the king is nothing else but the entire commonwealth. Therefore, if the king’s misdeeds ought to be concealed, the blemishes the commonwealth ought not be pointed out.
RESPONSE The visible misdeeds of kings usually offend us, since kings bear the person of the entire commonwealth. Yet I reply that this argument does not hold, since the blemishes of the commonwealth are not the king’s misdeeds. For albeit the king is the person of the entire commonwealth, yet he sins as a man, not as a magistrate. Furthermore, I deny kings’ misdeeds ought to be dissimulated, for this would be to sing pleasing tunes for kings. Nathan rebuked David’s adultery, but secretly. Elijah objected to Ahab’s apostasy, and indeed did so openly. John did not suffer Herod’s incest.
OBJECTION Machiavelli introduced countless ills into the commonwealth by describing is faults, as experience shows. Therefore they should not be described.
RESPONSE Machiavelli described these, not as faults, but as correct forms of administration, and criminally misled many unschooled and inexperienced men with the pestilent cleverness of his intellect.

Chapter iii

Are the differentiating features of republics correctly assigned?

HIS chapter comprehends three things, a distinction of republics, a refutation of certain philosophers, and the conclusion and exposition of the Philosopher’s opinion. In his distinction Aristotle proves that there are several republics, and assigns their distinct differentiating features according to the essence of their nature and their species. The reasoning in the text is as follows. Those things differ in species which have diverse species for their parts, republics have parts diverse in species, therefore republics differ in species. This argument is confirmed by an enumeration of their parts and many differentiating features of which the commonwealth is comprised and distinguished. For in any species of republic, he says, the commonwealth first coalesces out of diverse families, and then from the multitude of men living together, some of whom are wealthy, and others are poor or of the middle class and are, as it were, said to participate in both categories. Again, some of these men are given to the pursuit and endowments of war, and some to those of peace. There are yet others drawn from the common sort, of whom these are given to agriculture, those to commerce and other arts. There are also, he says, other differentiating features of noblemen, for among them some excel in breeding, others in virtue, and yet others in the magnitude of their wealth, such as once were the Eretrians, the Chalcidians, the Magnesians, and other Asians who were addicted to the rearing of horses who, relying on their own strength, breeding, and wealth, waged wars against their neighbors, and claimed the power of the few as if it were theirs by right. But mark you, in my judgment these things which the Philosopher is now listing are common differentiations of republics, for diverse administrations of the commonwealth are not distinguished by these differentiating features. For rich and poor, armed men and devotees of peace, men noble by birth and distinguished by virtue, farmers, traders, and others of that sort live in every constitution and condition of the commonwealth. So that I may consider this thing thoroughly, in part out of Aristotle and in part out of his interpreters, the distinction must be made that the differentiating features of republics are either common or proper: common ones are those I have mentioned, from which, analogically, as many constitutions of republics arise as there are differences and conditions of citizens. For example, if a people is warlike, soldiers; if given to gain, merchants; if it is zealous for honor, noblemen, if it accommodates itself to virtue, earnest and excellent men play the leading role. Hence the wise student of politics, having diligently pondered the people’s ways, will more accurately found the commonwealth, and more fitly conform it to laws.
2. These common differentiating features are therefore not to be ignored, since on their basis not only the distinction of the people, but also, in a certain way, the form of administration is understood. As the interpreters make the distinction, proper differentiating features are either general, such as correct and incorrect, in the way I have shown above, or special, and these are either according to virtue, such as the order of one man with respect to all men, the union of nobles, the consensus of all, or according to will, such as the desire of one man, the confusion of the few, and the conspiracy and madness of the people. Monarchy is discerned in the order of one man with respect to all men, aristocracy in the correct union of nobles, democracy and the just government of the people in the honorable consent of all men. From these three coalesces another which is called the mixed republic, such as for the most part flourishes all over the world nowadays. Within itself this contains an aggregate of all good things, this posses royal majesty, consular dignity, and popular consensus: in royal majesty is placed the civil order of the single head head, in consular dignity the union of the leading limbs to this head, in popular consensus the order and, if I may say so, the consummation of the whole body. There are also those who distinguish the republic in this manner, viz. that it is correct and incorrect, and that the correct is again either simple or mixed, and the simple is either supreme, as a kingdom, middling, as the government of optimates, or lowest, as the just power of the people; and finally the mixed, which is composed of these three in accordance with virtue’s laws. But what need for words? These two divisions have the same sense. I would only have this be appreciated, that legislators should carefully consider these differentiating features in defining the forms of republics. For otherwise they can neither rightly distinguish the diverse administrations of the commonwealth nor properly institute and order them.
3. The second thing to follow in the text is a refutation of certain philosophers who have posited only two primary species of republics, namely the popular and the power of a few, to which (as they claim) all the rest are reduced. They prove this by a double comparison. For as all winds can be reduced to North and South, and that all musical harmonies to the Doric and Phrygian modes, so all the remaining administrations of the commonwealth are reduced to a popular constitution and the government of the few, for example a polity to a popular constitution, the rule of optimates to the government of a few, since, just as all the winds in other regions of the sky share in the powers of the North and South winds, and are usually called by the same names (for the West wind is called the North, and the East wind the South), thus the rest of the forms and constitutions of the commonwealth share in the popular government and power of the few, with the result that they are often designated by these same names. But (as the Philosopher shows) this is an inadequately clear distinction of republics. Therefore he now offers the third thing treated in this chapter, namely the conclusion and exposition of his opinion, which is that the division of the republic advanced above is far superior to that confused division of the philosophers. He repeats his own division, namely into the correct and incorrect, and again divides the correct into the three species and the incorrect into three faults, as he divides them above. And that this may be understood more clearly he produces a certain similarity drawn from harmony, namely, just as one best symphony arises according to art from a concert of voices high and low, so one best monarchy or aristocracy is created from the consensus of citizens living according to virtue. But, just as voices that are too harsh or too weak depart from the best harmony, either slightly or simply, so administrations of the commonwealth that are constituted too softly or too harshly, are removed from the noblest form of government either a little, like the government of the people, or altogether, like the faults and vices of the commonwealth.

THE DISTINCTION OF THE QUESTION

 

4. OBJECTION In Book III, chapter v the Philosopher treated this distinction, therefore it is needlessly treated here too.
RESPONSE There it is treated generally, here specifically. There he only gives the species of the republic, here he gives their differentiating features. There he promises he will treat of these things in greater detail, here he performs this and keeps his promise.
OBJECTION Order, union and consensus are affections or accidents, therefore they are not genuine differentiating features of the commonwealth, for differentiating features involve things’ essences, but accidents are not essences, as Porphyry teaches.
RESPONSE They are accidents with respect to Man, but not with respect to the commonwealth. For they are present in Man as in the subject, but they are in the commonwealth definitively.
OBJECTION There are other differentiating features of the republic that are more proper, therefore these are ill-assigned. The antecedent is proven, since unity, fewness and manyness, related to the common good, are given by Aristotle as more genuine ones.
RESPONSE Every administration, the Philosopher says, belongs either to one, a few, or the entire multitude, yet from this it is incorrectly gathered that unity, fewness and manyness are more genuine differentiating features. For there Aristotle demonstrates material rather than form, number rather than nature. For the form and essence of the commonwealth consist, not in unity, fewness or manyness, but in their order, union, and consensus.
OBJECTION Union and order are general forms of the commonwealth, therefore in this context they are incorrectly assigned as special forms. The antecedent is clear in Book I of the Politics.
RESPONSE Union and order are general forms of the commonwealth, but the union of nobles and the order of one man with respect to the entire commonwealth are deemed to be special and distinct differentiating features.
OBJECTION The parts of the commonwealth are its men, men do not differ in species, therefore the parts of the commonwealth do not differ in species, as is said here in the text.
RESPONSE The parts of the commonwealth are either material, such as men, and thus they do not differ in species, or are formal, like rich and poor, nobles and commoners, and thus they differ in species. For albeit all of these are called men, yet in defining the commonwealth they are allotted a distinction by means of the things which differ in nature.

THE CHAPTER’S DOUBTFUL QUESTION
Are horses to be raised in the commonwealth for war?

5. Alexander had noble Bucephalus, Perseus had flying Pegasus. Darius was carried to the throne of Persia by the neighing of a horse. In this context the citizens of Eretria, Chalcis, Magnesia, and other cities of Asia are lauded for their horsemanship. The words of the Philosophers are these: The differentiating features of noblemen are according to wealth and size of estate, and some are horsemen, a function nobody can readily sustain unless he is wealthy. Wherefore in olden times every city governed by an oligarchy excelled in its cavalry and waged war against its enemies with its horse, such as the citizens of Eretria, Chalcis, and the others which I have just mentioned. Here four things come up for consideration: who in the commonwealth should raise horses, what the method should be, what the reward should be, and what is the end of all these things. The person is clear from his first words: The differentiating features of noblemen, &c. The method is implied in the following words, a function nobody can readily sustain unless he is wealthy. The reward follows, namely the power of the few. But the end is to defend and preserve the commonwealth in war. But, to confirm these things with a few words, I maintain that horses are to be raised for war in the commonwealth, first, because they are animals of noble spirit, then since they can be trained for war, also since they are complaint for their riders, and finally since they are brave and eager for victory. And three things urge that nobles should raise them, nation, wealth and reputation: the nation, which has the need; the wealth, which readily supports this duty; reputation, so that in the defense of the commonwealth these nobles may prove themselves genuine armigerous knights. For why should noblemen be called knights if then neither raise horses for the advantage of the republic nor themselves as armed knights charge the enemy van? Everywhere noblemen acquire wealth, therefore they have the wherewithal for the raising. If they look to their nation’s enemy, they have an end for which to raise them. Among the Romans, who first instituted this order, “knight” was once an honorable title. So why should it not thrive among the English, why not among all people?

THE DISTINCTION

6. OBJECTION It is excessively base and flatly absurd for noblemen to deal with sordid and illiberal things, to raise horses is to deal with sordid and illiberal things, therefore it is base and absurd that noblemen should raise horses.
RESPONSE Your objection is ridiculous, for in this context I do not mean that noblemen should muck stables or feed hay and oat to their horses, but that they should feed horses at their own expense, and, when needs be, riding on them they fight stoutly against the enemy, as once did Roman knights.
OBJECTION The utility of raising horses is public and common, namely the safety of the nation, therefore the whole commonwealth rather than the nobility should be burdened with these expenses.
REPLY This reasoning does not follow, since every part should strive for the good of the whole. So if noblemen are, as it were, the eyes of the republic, it is their duty to consult and provide for the commonwealth in these eventualities. Yet I do not deny that the entire commonwealth should contribute for this purpose, most especially when in this thing noblemen prove inadequate.

Chapter iv

Should plebiscites be regarded as having the force of law?

EFORE I come to a fuller description of the proposed question, I shall run through the things contained in the text clearly and briefly. And although in this small Book Aristotle turns himself about in circles and spirals like the hare running before hounds so that while many dogs seek his tracks, running in a circle, he himself hides himself in his lair and warren, nevertheless I shall tirelessly and (as they say) step by step pursue himself until with keen and eager eyes I come across him hiding amidst the thornbrakes. For I believe that many interpreters have removed their shaking hands from these tables (which remain to be illustrated by more copious commentaries), either because they have seen the same thing often treated, or because they have not caught the running author. But while they are silent, or at least do not speak plainly, Athens is cheated of most useful and very necessary questions. There is no excuse that interpretation would be otiose, for this thing can never be treated more frequently than it should be, nor is Aristotle wandering here, unless these gentlemen understand wandering to be this: to put the question in one part of the book, and assign the causes in another. But this only happened because of the abundance of things which incidentally occur with a subtle connection and association. In this context I have written rather copiously about this thing, since in this portion I have perceived most commentators to be listless and drowsy.
2. But these things are said by the way. Now I approach the Philosopher himself, who proposes three things in this chapter: a doubt about popular government and the power of the few, an enumeration of the parts requisite for every commonwealth, and a division of popular power into six species, which are set forth in their due order and place. The doubt is whether popular government and that of the few differ only in terms of largeness or smallness. Out of Aristotle, I have previously touched upon this briefly, and have shown that the Philosopher teaches that popular government is that in which the freeborn poor dominate, be they many or few, but that the power of the few is that in which the rich and wealthy dominate, be they many or few. For manyness and smallness are accidental features of these administrations. For in the commonwealth it happens that they are many paupers and fewer wealthy men, therefore these constitutions are not distinguished by manyness and fewness, but by affluence and want of property. The Philosopher proves this from a number, from a custom, and from an example. From a number: if (says he) all the men in the commonwealth are thirteen hundred, of whom a thousand are wealthy and concede no part of government to three hundred, this administration should nevertheless be called the power of the few, albeit within it a majority rules. The reason is that, not manyness and fewness, but wealthy and poverty distinguish these two forms and species of administration. Custom, by which, according to Aristotle, the Ethiopians were wont to distribute their honors according to largeness of body or comeliness of face. The example is that of the Ionians, or rustics, who by a certain exercise of violence gave preference to native freeborn men. But these things are most clear in the text.
3. The second thing dealt with is an enumeration of the parts which are requisite for every commonwealth, in which enumeration he first proves that there are parts and species of the republic from a comparison with animals, in this way. As it is with in an animal, so it is in the commonwealth, there are many parts and species of animal, therefore there are many parts and species of the commonwealth. He proves this comparison from those parts of an animal which produce a distinction of forms, such as instruments of perception, nourishment and movement: of perception, such as the eye and the tongue; of nourishment, such as the mouth and the stomach; of movement, such as feet and the other organs animals use in moving about. Having made this comparison he lists the parts themselves, which are ten in number. The first is comprised of farmers, who till the fields. The second of artisans, who profess the civil arts. The third of merchants, who spend their time in the market; The fourth of hirelings, who are hired to labor like slaves, and (as Aristotle says) Plato has learnedly demonstrated these parts. But he reprehends Plato in this, that he imagined the commonwealth to consist only of necessary parts. Therefore he adds others. So the fifth is of the multitude of soldiers or champions, who defend the nation. The sixth is of judges, who deal with the laws. The seventh is of councilors, who consult about affairs of state. The eighth is of magnates, who use their wealth to assist the commonwealth. The ninth is of magistrates, who hold the offices and honors of the republic. The tenth is of the morally earnest, who outshine the rest with the example of their life.
4. A third thing now follows, namely a distribution of popular power into its species, and that there are several species of this thing is proven in the following way. Whatever thing has parts diverse in nature likewise has diverse species, both the power of the few and popular power have parts diverse in nature, therefore both the power of the few and popular power have diverse species. In the text, the assumption is confirmed by induction: for example, the popular constitution has farmers, artisans, merchants, sailors, fishermen and men of related pursuits, from whom various species of administration arise, as Tarentum and Byzantium are administered by fishermen, Athens by the men of the fleet and the navy, Aegina and Chios by merchants, and Tenedos by ferrymen. Aristotle shows that the power of the few likewise consists of various parts, since some noblemen are such because of wealth, others because of honors, others because of virtue, and others pursue literature and wisdom. With these things having been posited, he describes five species of popular government. The first is placed in equality of administration, that is, when the whole people rules together so that one man does not surpass another in authority. The second involves a kind of inequality, which is that honor is assigned to each man in proportion to his inherited fortune. The third is when the entire people is master according to law rather than its will, with only those individuals excepted who have some blemish or impediment of family. The fourth is a constitution in which citizen is distinguished from non-citizen by authority and law, and the dignity of the republic is assigned to each citizen in proportion to the merit of his virtue. The final one is when the entire multitude governs and everybody has an equal opportunity to perform a magistracy, but in a way that the laws do not rule, but rather plebiscites have the force of law. As Aristotle says, this mostly happens when certain demagogues (such as the tribunes of the people once were among the Romans) flatter the multitude and frequently draw it to a tyrannical and intolerable power. The Philosopher therefore concludes with the testimony of Homer and the authority of the ancient philosophers, who rightly rejected power of this variety as illegitimate and unjust, inasmuch as (so they say) it is not a genuine republic in which the laws are mute and only the plebiscites of the mad people hold sway.
5. So much for an exposition of the text. Now we are dealing with the question, which is whether a plebiscite should be regarded as having the force of law. There is one species of popular power which the Philosopher criticizes in this context as being unjust, namely that in which the people governs and dominates without law. In it, he says, demagogues and flatterers, Siren-like with their sweet talk, make the people proud and tyrannical, and easily induce it to abrogate the laws and confirm its own plebiscites. But he maintains that such a democracy is in no wise a correct form and species of administration, and adds the reason that edicts and decrees of the people should not be regarded as having the force of law, since decrees are promulgated regarding individual matters, but laws deal with universals. This question has just been repeated, whether a plebiscite should have the force of law. In every constitution of the republic, both correct and incorrect, the multitude is present and comprises a large part of the commonwealth, so much so that, without it, magistrates cannot be created, nor laws made, nor councils held, nor any public business conducted. For thought must always be had for the multitude, lest it be held in contempt and become unruly and seditious. As it must sometimes be gently soothed so it does not rage, so it is often to be coerced by the prudence of the magistrates lest it grow insolent, since, when the people is rendered more effeminate by license of living it quickly throws off the bridle of the laws and scorns every law, as it does every magistrate. Therefore let there be plebiscites, let there be certain edicts of the multitude, but let them prevail only temporarily and not have the force of law. With a few words I prove this thing from the nature of law, from the ignorance of the multitude, from the unhappiness of the commonwealth in which only plebiscites hold sway. From the nature of law, since all law is universal, but plebiscites deal with individual and uncertain matters. The law remains firm, just, single and immutable, but decrees of the multitude are deemed to be frail always, often unjust, and most chamaeleon-like. Therefore they do not have the weight and authority of laws. From the ignorance of the multitude, since, as I have shown above, there are parts of the commonwealth like parts of an animal, some for nourishment, some for motion, some for sense and reason, and the people is reckoned among those parts which are requisite for nourishment and motion, but not among those which are superior in the excellence of their sense and reason, such as are good and prudent men who are called the eyes and lights of the commonwealth. Therefore in plebiscites there is not such a force of reason that their decrees are to be inscribed in the tablets of the republic in place of laws. From the misery of commonwealths in which popular decrees hold first place, since what is more unhappy, more deadly in the republic than to depend on the multitude’s strange statutes and fickle opinions? There are many cases and various events, and men’s wills are flexible, especially those of the ignorant, such as are most of the multitude. For as often as vicissitudes of this kind in citizens’ affairs occur, so often new plebiscites and fantasies of the people are manufactured. There is nobody, no matter how unschooled and inexperienced with affairs, who fails to see how wretched is that administration of the republic.
6. Therefore those men are intolerably mad who, during changes of republics, are willing to have plebiscites, established by the impulse of emotion rather than by reason, inscribed on bronze (as they say) instead of laws. If legislators urge this as a way of choosing the lesser of two evils and stabbing the heart of the commonwealth more gently, they seem to me to be smothered by the smoke while avoiding the flames. For during a storm of the republic, what else is it to prefer plebiscites to the counsels of wise men than to refuse meals and wretchedly perish of starvation? For the table of the multitude is scanty and lacking in salt, but on the table of the wise banquets are set by wisdom. Yet here it is to be considered that when the magistrates squabble among themselves, as it were with the eyes of the republic blinded, it should be permitted the more prudent sort of people to promulgate decrees and observe them instead of laws for a time. But when the commonwealth returns from the reefs to the harbor, from the storm to calm, by the consensus of the commonwealth these decrees should be suspended, and in their place let there be laws, without which every polity (as the Philosopher concludes here) is weakened and hamstrung.

THE DISTINCTION OF THE QUESTION

 

AN ARGUMENT AGAINST THE CHAPTER’S FIRST PART

7. OBJECTION Wealth and poverty are accidents of the commonwealth, therefore in this context democracy and the power of the few are incorrectly defined by these commentators. The antecedent is clear, since wealth and poverty befall men by chance. The argument is proven, since accidents cannot be truly defined.
RESPONSE These two constitutions and forms of administration are not defined by wealth and poverty, but by the diverse rationale of governing of those men who are affected in these varying ways. Wherefore, even if wealth and poverty are accidents of the commonwealth, the diverse rationales of wealthy and poor administrators are posited, not as accidents, but as distinct differentiating features of republics.

AN ARGUMENT AGAINST THE CHAPTER’S SECOND PART

OBJECTION There are more parts of the commonwealth, therefore all of them are not rightly enumerated in this context. The antecedent is clear from Book I, where there pastoral art, and from Book II, where Aristotle lists the priestly dignity as parts of the commonwealth.
RESPONSE Shepherds should be reduced to the generality of farmers, priests to the college of the good and earnest, and wise and learned men to the class of nobles.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE CHAPTER’S THIRD PART

8. OBJECTION Equal power of individual citizens is impossible, therefore the first species of democracy is ill-defined. The antecedent is proven, since it is impossible that an infinite multitude can coexist in an equal standing of wealth and honors.
RESPONSE By equal power the Philosopher understands equal liberty to gain a magistracy in the republic, wherefore even if there is an inequality of property, there still can be a like proportion of honors, and thus the Philosopher understands it.
OBJECTION The second species of democracy requires a defined amount of wealth for a citizen to be admitted to a magistracy, therefore it cannot properly be called a popular constitution. The antecedent is clear in the text. The argument is proven, since the greater part of the multitude lacks wealth, and for those laboring from this defect access to every station in the republic is closed.
RESPONSE Some commentators reply that in this context these species are defined analogically, but it can be said that here Aristotle is requiring a very small and insignificant amount and quantity of wealth, as is manifestly evident in the text.
OBJECTION Tyranny is no species of democracy, but the last species given here is a tyranny, therefore it is no species of democracy. The major premise is agreed, since these are distinct kinds of commonwealth. The minor is proven, since in this species the people, addicted to flatters, rules according to its will and whim, with every law abrogated.
RESPONSE The Philosopher denies in the text that this is a genuine species of popular power, since in it the people lives according to its own decrees, not according to laws and institutions of its forefathers.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE QUESTION

OBJECTION Plebiscites are laws, therefore they are to be regarded as having the force of law. The antecedent is proven, since plebiscites are rules for living made and approved by the consensus of the entire commonwealth.
RESPONSE If by the people you mean the entire commonwealth, what you say is true. But if by the people you only mean a part, and that not the first one, I deny this.
OBJECTION In a popular constitution the people is the entire commonwealth, therefore in a popular constitution plebiscites should be regarded as having the force of law.
RESPONSE The argument does not hold. For even if the people is called the entire commonwealth, yet withinÔ administration there is an order of dignity, so that some preside over others and govern them, and if these men’s consent is not granted a decree should not be regarded as having the force of law. Therefore in a popular constitution there is an equality of dignity, not because in fact each and every citizen is equal in participation in dignity (for this would be absurd), but because each and every citizen has the ability to be equal, and this is regarded as just in the first species of democracy.

THE CHAPTER’S DOUBTFUL QUESTION
Are flattering courtiers the cause of tyranny?

9. Flattery is the most dangerous beast of them all, especially in the court of the prince. For, just as lightning often shatters bone while the skin remains unharmed, thus the flattery of kings wounds their hearts under the guise of friendship. For flattery is the Siren’s sweetest song, but it has the greedy gut of Charybdis; it is pleasant yet rough, sweet yet bitter, fair yet black. Why say more? It is human in its face, yet is a viper. I shall speak about it elsewhere, and not say many words about it here. But since since in the text Aristotle maintains that flatters are tyrants’ companions, and that they are the reasons tyrants are ruled by lust instead of reason, will instead of law, plebiscites and popular edicts rather than ancestral customs, I shall not find it burdensome to demonstrate in a word that these monsters are the very calamities and plagues of the republics in which they are suffered. I prove this first from the nature of the flatter, who is a friend in appearance, but an enemy in his mind, entirely a dissimulator and a man bent on the destruction of life. If this be so, in the manner of a fire he will strive to convert and all the men with whom he has dealings to his own nature. And if once he infects the men and princes (with whom he most lives and spends his time), there is a danger lest they themselves become dissimulators, and, with reason’s government abandoned, follow the passions and emotions of their mind. And what else it is to rule according to emotion than to transmute a kingdom into a tyranny? For indeed, if leading men suck from the teats of flatterers, as if struck by the fangs of asps they immediately fall into a lethargy and a deep sleep, the perpetually dream in a vale of fantasies, giving over to oblivion who they are and whence they have arisen, they indulge their emotions, they hold the laws in contempt, corrupt their citizens, deceive the commonwealth, become wholly tyrants and cruel men. For, that I may prove this from the effect of Gnatho’s art, it is agreed that the life of flatterers is insidious, and that they tend to blind the king and gouge out his eyes. When this is done, first princes fall into egotism and self-love, then into contempt and hatred of others. Hence for the commonwealth flow fraud, perfidy, imperious will, swift appetite for revenge, abrogation of laws, and six hundred other evils, which argue and represent tyranny rather than a peaceful constitution and administration of the republic. Finally, to deal by example, what made Nero, so very chastely reared, a cruel man? Flattery. What made Caesar rebel against his nation? Flattery. What made Rehoboam King of Israel a tyrant? His contempt for the gravest senators and the flattery of naughty youths. Here I can cite examples closer to home, Richard II and Richard III, both of whom were greatly harmed by flattery, but so that the former, having been wounded, recuperated, but the latter bequeathed us Englishmen the brutal tragedy of his tyranny, in which he himself was an actor. Oh would that princes would avert their ears from these masked Gnathos, and not put faith in their charms and incantations! One man like Clytus is preferable to six hundred men like Aristippus, but (oh the sorrow) Alexander ran Clytus through with a lance, while men like Aristippus rule the roost in many a prince’s court.

THE DISTINCTION IS OBVIOUS IN THE PROOF THE THE CONTENTION

10. OBJECTION Kings who support the burden of the republic, as great as Mt. Etna, sometimes have need of pleasant men, by whose witticisms and jests they may be refreshed: such are flatters, therefore kings must be allowed to have their flatterers.
RESPONSE This reasoning rightly proves that affable and pleasant men are to be permitted in princes’ courts, but not flatterers or parasites. One should spread about and employ jokes rather than frauds, sallies of wit rather than treacheries. Furthermore, I deny the minor premise of this syllogism. For affable men do not dissimulate, they do not lie, which two things they cannot do without evil intent. As for the fact that they invent wonderful and admirable things, they only do this to delight their hearers, not to deceive them; to refresh them, not to betray and ensnare them.
OBJECTION Sorrow, grief and troubles are in tyranny, therefore its causes are not flatterers. The argument is proven, since flatters seek pleasant and happy things to say, but tyranny’s results are contrary to these, therefore they are not the causes of tyranny.
RESPONSE Flatters are not men who always speak pleasant and amusing things, but are men who sometimes handle great and weighty matters under a show of gravity and prudence. Therefore I reply that this argument does not hold. For although sorrow, grief, and a thousand troubles follow upon tyranny, flatters who think one thing and say another can still exist as its causes. The reason is that beneath a cloak of dissimulation they hide the fertile eggs of malice, from which they engender toothed scorpions, and often send these against the hearts of good citizens.

Chapter v

When the form of the commonwealth has been changed should the same laws be retained for a time?

N the present chapter the Philosopher employs Laconic brevity, and says very few things about the power of the few and its forms. If you seek the order of his reasoning, I would have you remember that these two kinds of republic, namely popular power and the power of the few, are joined together by Aristotle. Therefore, as he has just expounded about popular power, so now he does about the administration of the few. This is an analysis of the text, that there are four species of the power of the few. The first is defined as the government of those men who transcend other citizens in their great estates and riches. Such men are like Croesus and Lucullus among the multitude, who magnificently undertake magistracies at their own expense and strive to spend their own money for the glory of the entire commonwealth. To this dignity only comes Plutus, but not Irus, the wealthy man, but not the pauper. There is an example of this thing at home, if you think about the Lord Mayors and Aldermen of London, who are not elected by the commoners’ consensus to the highest seats of honor in the city unless they have jewels in their minds, and gold in their hands. The second species of the power of the few is the administration of those men who, dominant though their fortunes be slender, elect other men to office according to their will, particularly such men from whom thye expect some rather lavish advantage.This form of administration is improper and dishonest, since in it gain rather than virtue is sought. For were they to elect others to undertake a magistracy according to virtue, this form of government should be called the government of the best rather than the power of the few. The third species is defined in a word in the text, when a son gains the mastery upon his father’s death, that is, when either by their popularity with the people or in any other way wealthy men gain a right of succession in the administration. This form is praiseworthy if the possession of virtue plays a role in succession and account of the laws is taken. The fourth species is when sons of wealth men govern the republic by succession without law and virtue, but this government is by far the worst and is no less the opposite of the third species than tyranny is of monarchy and the last species of popular government (the tribunician) is the opposite of another which is managed according to virtue, inasmuch as in these three (namely, tyranny, tribunician government and the depraved succession of the few) the virtues and the laws are abolished, and in their plac rulee rage, violence and lust. The final thing handled in this chapter is a certain admonition which ought not to escape our notice, that it is possible for there to exist a republic that is not popular in its laws, which nevertheless you may observe to be such in its customs, and vice versa. Hence it comes about that Aristotle makes a conjecture about the change of republics. For when (for the weightiest causes) one administration is changed into another, for example, popular government into the power of the few, it is the better part of wisdom to retain the same laws for a time, lest their sudden change offend the people and produce a violent upheaval of the commonwealth.
2. From this arises the question I am now discussing, whether when the form of the commonwealth has been changed the laws should remain the same for a time. In the same way that an inveterate form is most rarely dissolved, so a form of the commonwealth is changed with the greatest of difficulty. But if it should be changed for the weightiest of reasons, great precaution must be taken lest the daughter devour her mother, that is, lest this novel alteration destroy the commonwealth. In a change of the republic it is better to imitate the slowness of the tortoise rather than the speed of the hair. One must make haste slowly (as they say), and in such great matters quick enough, if good enough. Once upon a time, when King Tarquin had been expelled and their monarchy was transformed into an aristocracy, the Romans sagely preserved the laws of their former constitution for a while, which was also done when the Senate declined into popular government. These wise men did this, in my opinion, so that the people might gradually be enticed to new customs and new laws, the people which, stricken by a sudden impulse, grows mad, but which softens when gently persuaded. In a change of the republic, therefore, one must wink at many things, and evil is often to be forgiven and sometimes to be tolerated, if appeal to old laws (lately the oracles of the commonwealth) should be made by the multitude. For if it were to be done otherwise, and after a change of constitution citizens should immediately be compelled to obey novel laws, it is to be feared lest the stifled smoke might break forth into the flames of sedition and shatter the foundations of the commonwealth with its violent motion. In the Ethics the Philosopher urges that new laws be fitted to the people’s habits, like the Lesbian rule to stones, that is, that men’s customs are not rashly to be changed by new laws, but gradually bent upright. And if he gives this precept about writing laws, what would he choose to prescribe about changing those which daily usage has confirmed? Indeed it is easier to found a new commonwealth with new laws than to distract and alienate citizens’ minds from old one. The reason is that the former contains the seed, whereas the latter contains the root and branch. Furthermore, just as among the Egyptians there was a law that for a time physicians should not intermeddle with patients’ humors but wait upon the force of nature, thus it is indeed to be hoped that the custodians of the commonwealth suffer old laws until the time that, by their suasion, they can make some change in the people’s ways. For just as there is great risk to nature in intermeddling with the humors of the body before a prescribed time, so a great damage threatens the republic in changing the laws of the commonwealth before persuading the people. Therefore those who change the constitutions of republics advisedly and wisely do not aim at a sudden innovation in the laws, but, following the shadow of the people, hesitantly and gradually revolve the sphere of the republic until they can, as it were, put their finger on the desired point, and by their manifold turnings fix and established the pivots of the commonwealth in a predetermined constitution. For in this way a mollified citizenry can easily be drawn in the direction you desire, and will support your newly consecrated laws without any murmuring.
3. But, you will say, what manner of change in the republic is this, if laws and customs remain the same? Are not the laws the sinews of the republic, from which it has its sense and movement towards its good? Therefore is it possible that the form of the commonwealth can be said to be changed when its old laws are unchanged? Mark you, just as one cannot pass from one extreme to another without going through a middle point, so the people cannot be moved from one form of the commonwealth to another without a middle. So, therefore, I am willing that the constitution of the republic sometimes be changed for just causes, but in such a way that this conversion and change occur by middles, not extremes. So let the old laws remain and prevail for a space. But let the words of the wise men be yet more prevalent, by whose moderation, as if by a kind of sweet modulation, the affections and customs of the people might be altered. And when this happens, let their words prevail yet the laws be more prevalent, and let those who resist the laws be severely chastised. We read of Julian the Apostate, that object of hatred to God and men, who, after he first departed from the token of our salvation and from religion, cleverly and cunningly said that all Christian men were honest, called their holy religion an error but not a heresy, and even allowed them to live by his side at court in accordance with the ancient laws. But then, when he conceived a greater dislike of them, he drove them from the palace, and finally, when customs had changed thanks to the license of the peopl,e and new laws had been established, he command them to be dragged off to the dungeon and the cross. If Julian the Apostate, his kingship changed into a tyranny, employed these means according to a pretext of virtue and seduced the people into an approval of his tyranny, how better and how much more piously should good princes employ these means in changing worse forms of republics into juster ones? In good men, this is prudence; in bad men, cunning. For in the morally earnest this tends to the common good; in the felonious, to the public peril. But you object that the old laws are perhaps entirely bad. So what? “Therefore they are to be abolished without any delay.” I deny your reasoning, not because evils should not be removed, but they should be tolerated for a space lest greater dangers be created. So do you want old laws to be abolished in a change of the constitution? “I do, but thus that with them abolished the multitude does not go mad. And indeed, to retain laws yet not obey them begets riot and madness.” It does not do so, if only wise magistrate preside, who may moderate the people’s emotions. “But laws are not laws if it is permitted to violate them.” This is true — if reason and not emotion should rule.

THE DISTINCTION OF THE QUESTION

 

OBJECTIONS TO THE FIRST PART OF THE CHAPTER

4. OBJECTION The second species of the power of the few is not distinguished from the second species of popular government, therefore these species are wrongly defined as distinct ones. The antecedent is proven, since (as is evident) both species are ones in which men hold power according to a slight and slender estate of wealth.
RESPONSE Although in both constitutions a small estate of wealth is requisite, they nevertheless differ in that in the second species of popular power a small but defined estate is required, but in the second species of the power of the few a small and indefinite estate is requisite. In this, furthermore, there is a second distinction, that in the government of the people it is not in the power of magistrates to elect others for their own interest, but in this form of the power of the few it will be permitted them to take to themselves other men as they wish.
OBJECTION The power of the few is that in which the wealthy hold sway, but in the second species the wealthy do not hold sway, therefore the second species of the power of the few does not exist. The minor premise is proven, since wealthy men do not have a small estate, but a large one and a mass of riches.
RESPONSE An estate is said to be small comparatively, not absolutely. For it is not small but with respect to those who possess a greater one.

OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE PROPOSED QUESTION

5. OBJECTION Diverse constitutions and forms of the commonwealth depend upon diverse laws, therefore when the constitution of the commonwealth has changed it is not fitting to retain the same laws. The antecedent is obvious, since the laws of any commonwealth articulate its form and its constitution. The argument is proven, since without agreeable laws forms of administration pull the citizens apart towards contrary and diverse ends.
RESPONSE In a change of the commonwealth laws are considered in two ways, either defectively (as they say), or perfectively. Old laws are indeed retained, but defectively, like natural heat in the corruption of life. And new laws are established, but perfectively, like forms of a plant after the corruption of its seed. Therefore laws are not retained so they may live, but so they may fail; not that they might prevail for shaping the people’s customs, but that they may decline altogether when new ones have been confirmed.
OBJECTIONS Contraries cannot exist in the same thing, laws of diverse forms of constitution are contraries, therefore they cannot exist in the same commonwealth.
RESPONSE Contraries are understood in two ways, either intensely (as they say), and thus they are not simultaneously present within it, or remissively, and thus they can be present simultaneously. I speak likewise about contrary laws in a change of the commonwealth, of which the former (namely the old ones) are placed in a state of decline, but the latter in a state of perfection.
OBJECTION If illness should suddenly be changed into health, this does not harm the body, therefore if a depraved constitution of the republic should suddenly be changed for the good, this does not harm the commonwealth. The reasoning holds because of the likeness of the natural body to the civil.
RESPONSE These similarities do not hold in all things, and so the reasoning does not follow. Furthermore, it rarely occurs that health once lost is suddenly recovered. Nay, rather in this comparison a proportion of reasoning holds, that, just as the natural body is not corrupted immediately, so the civil body (which is the commonwealth) is not prudently changed at one fell swoop. For, as hot water gradually and by degrees loses its former nature and substance, thus one form of administration, being altered into another, loses its powers (as they say) by successive steps. Therefore in this the magistrate’s prudence is discerned: that the old laws are retained for a time, like the shadows of the body, not so the citizens might observe them, but that by gaining insight into their deficiencies they might hasten and hurry to another constitution of the commonwealth.

THE CHAPTER’S DOUBTFUL QUESTION
Is a simple oligarchy worse than a mixed one?

6. Oligarchy is simple and absolute in which the emotion rather than the reason of the few, their impulse rather than their intellect rules. The first three species of the power of the few are mixed, but the final one is called simple and absolute. With this comparison now having been made, it is asked whether this form should be deemed worse than the others. The Philosopher replies that it is, and proves this by three arguments, of which the first is from the standpoint of the law, the second from that of the magistrate, and the final one from that of the end. From the standpoint of the law, since in this form it is deficient, but law holds first place in the other forms of oligarchy. From the standpoint of the magistrate, since tyrants reign in it, but it is not the same in the others. From the standpoint of the end, since in it the common good is not sought, as it is in the rest. Therefore if in this form of administration neither laws, nor reason, nor magistrates, nor justice or equity have any place, it follows that, in comparison with the rest, it is to be regarded as by far the worst.

THE DISTINCTION IS OBVIOUS

OBJECTION Other species of oligarchy are very much opposed to virtue, therefore they are very bad, and in consequence the final species is not worse. The antecedent is proven, since every oligarchy is the opposite of aristocracy, which is ruled by justice and equity alone.
RESPONSE Although the greatest account is taken of the wealthy in every oligarchy, there is a certain proportion and comparison of good and bad between these forms. For those administrations are not as opposed to justice in which life is led according to laws as is this one, in which, not law, but rather the lust of the few is master.
OBJECTION Other forms of oligarchy are worse, therefore this comparison is unfair. The antecedent is proven, since the others are more armed by laws, but the final species does not have laws.
RESPONSE This reasoning would follow if all magistrates in the other forms of oligarchy were wholly unjust men and all their laws unfair. But it is not so, for in the power of the few there are many earnest citizens, and useful and necessary laws, as Aristotle often insinuates.

Chapter vi

Are bastards citizens?

EST this preceding exposition of the forms of popular government and the power of the few seem rather barren and scanty, the Philosopher now shows the causes and rationales of both. And inasmuch as the first species of democracy, in which equality and liberty are striven for, is common to the rest, he prudently omits it and first of all explains the rationale of the second species. This kind, as I have previously related, is that in which those who have a small, predefined estate of wealth are elevated to the magistracies and honors of the republic, such as farmers, artisans, and others of the kind who have slim and slender means. In this constitution, he says, one should live, not according to Man’s will, but according to the prescript of law. The reason is that citizens endowed with slight means do not have the leisure time to sustain the burden and perpetual care of the republic. In this form of democracy, therefore, the small estate is the cause why the law rule, since citizens laboring from a kind of poverty cannot be free to serve the republic save for fixed and definite periods of time. Another kind of popular power is that in which no account is taken of the citizen’s estate and the duties and dignities of the republic lie open for everybody, with the sole exception of those men who are either branded by nature or experience the sinister hand of fortune, such as bastards and a few other men of that ilk. In this kind, too, the laws are master. The reason is these republics do not have enough income that those who are to undertake magistracies can have sufficient leisure time. The third kind is one in which only slaves are excluded from the administration of the commonwealth. Under this constitution, too, life is lead according to laws, since sufficient wealth for leisure time is unavailable. The final kind of democracy is one in which the entire people live according to their will rather than the prescript of the laws; flattery of the people has given birth to this constitution, license has enhanced it, and the madness of the multitude has confirmed it.
3. This is a full analysis and description of the text. Now the question follows, which is whether bastards should be citizens. If you urge upon me that Aristotle has not mentioned bastards in this context, I reply that in describing the second kind of popular power he has insinuated the very thing we are seeking. His words are these, it is allowed everybody to have access to the republic, save for those who are debarred by an exception involving their family. By an exception involving their family Sepulveda and other learned interpreters understand bastards. But I am not arguing about the word, I am seeking the thing itself. In every commonwealth a pious and unbreakable union of husband and wife has been established, so that legitimate offspring, as it were the free and undamaged crop might be engendered. Therefore he who violates this union, he who tears asunder this pact that has, as it were, been stricken by the hand of nature, who befouls another man’s marriage-bed with the foam of his baseness, he offends, first, against nature, then against justice, and finally against himself: against nature, which gave birth to this connection, against justice, which nourished it once it was born, and against himself, who by this crime makes himself an object of hatred to the commonwealth. Therefore it is an unworthy thing that bastards, the products of such crimes, should obtain dignity in the republic and become partners in the commonwealth (which is only an association of freeborn men). Furthermore, what else is it to admit bastards and degenerates to the commonwealth’s council and senate than to kindle the torches of lust, and to give free rein to corrupters of virgins, adulterers, those who practice incest, and other monsters of men? When these people see their bastards, conceived by their furtive seed and unjustly born, flourishing in the commonwealth no less than legitimately born sons, liberally educated, they rush headlong to Plato’s republic and the sharing of wives, to the monstrosity of their crimes, to all license of life. Then too, since every well-regulated commonwealth should have a particular concern for its name and reputation, it is unseemly, nay, it is impious to name and appoint bastards to benches, counsels, honors and offices. For, beyond the example of evil which is in this way bequeathed to posterity, a deadly hatred is engendered between these fellows and good citizens, since earnest men will tolerate it grudgingly and with indignation that bastards are made their peers and equals in participation in the commonwealth.
4. Add to this also the fact that from the very cradle (as they say) bastards frequently turn out to be men of the vilest morals and most dissolute. To bestow freedom on such men and make them citizens is to make the commonwealth unjust and criminal. If you ask reasons why bastards are for the most part base fellows, I respond out of the Philosopher, first, that they arise from evil beginnings; second, that they are usually brought up less carefully than the legitimately born; and lastly, that with the bond of such a holy association sundered, the powers of justice do not flow and spread themselves abundantly in their hearts. If, therefore, bad men usually beget bad men, if bad men educate bad men from their tender years either more effeminately or more negligently, if the influence of eternal justice rarely nourishes bad men produced by bad men, and rarely ornaments them according to that saying, bastard shoots do not strike deep root, why do we make bastards citizens? Why do we inscribe their name in the roster of the commonwealth? Then too, if we justly deny an inheritance to the illegitimately born, why do we grant them the commonwealth? Finally, in this matter let the examples of our ancestors instruct us, since the Romans, the Athenians, the Spartans and many other commonwealths living according to the norm of justice flatly denied bastards the freedom and partnership of the commonwealth. Nay, what’s greatest, God adjudges adulterers worthy of death, and bastards unworthy of the commonwealth. So they should neither be citizens nor enjoy the benefits of the commonwealth.

THE DISTINCTION OF THE QUESTION

 

AN OBJECTION AGAINST THE FIRST PART

5. OBJECTION This distinction of democracy and oligarchy has been treated before, therefore Aristotle is acting idly.
RESPONSE Here not just the distinction, but also the logic of the distinction is demonstrated here by the Philosopher.

OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE QUESTION

OBJECTION It is unjust to deny liberty to the harmless and the innocent, bastards are harmless and innocent, therefore it is unjust to deny them the liberty of the commonwealth. The major premise is agreed, since the property of justice is not to harm the innocent. The minor is proven, since it is not a voluntary act of bastards that they are created such.
RESPONSE Not only is evil to be removed in the commonwealth, but also the occasion of evildoing. Therefore the sins of the parents are to be coerced in their bastards, not because the bastards offend, but so by the infliction of this penalty the lustful might be deterred from this crime. Furthermore some commentators reply that by this the commonwealth avoids not only sin but also unseemliness, since the matter is full of infamy, that bastards (who bear the taint of blood on their brows) should shine in the high seats of the commonwealth.
OBJECTION Nobody without guilt ought to be punished, bastards are without guilt, therefore they ought not to be punished.
RESPONSE My answer is that it is not absurd for somebody to be punished privatively (as they way) through no fault of his own, even if this should should seem to be unjust positively. For according the law a man can be punished without guilt, but nobody should be chastised without cause. The guilt is the parents’, who committed the crime, but because the taint of their crime clings to the bastard, this taint is not absurdly erased by the deprivation of the commonwealth in him.
OBJECTION The blemish of his birth in a bastard can be erased by the splendor of virtue, therefore the blemish of birth is not a sufficient cause for deprivation. The reasoning follows, since in every commonwealth virtue is to be preferred.
RESPONSE It can sometimes happen that a bastard outshines others in the virtues of his mind. But, inasmuch as this rarely occurs, the commonwealth has created this universal law. Wherefore, even if a bastard is sometimes admitted to the commonwealth because of the divine wisdom with which he surpasses everybody, this is an exception of the law, not its violation. For, just as a single swallow does not a springtime make, so one or two exceptions do not destroy the universal force and effectiveness of the law.
OBJECTION Many bastards are unknown to the commonwealth, upon whom liberty as bestowed as if they were legitimate. Therefore bastards are citizens.
RESPONSE This reasoning from a secondary consideration (as they say) to a simple one is fallacious. For, just as this argument follows, a dead man is a corpse, therefore a man is a corpse, so your present reasoning does not hang together, an unrecognized bastard is a citizen, therefore a bastard is a citizen.

THE CHAPTER’S DOUBTFUL QUESTION
May magistrates receive a salary?

6. Why are you so hot to become a tribune, Saturninus? Why snatch at office? I know what you want: you are hoping for a salary. You impious man, do you seek a kingdom for profit? “Why not indeed, since it is permissible?” What are you saying, rascal? You say it’s permissible? “I say so.” How, pray, do you have the nerve to say this? “The same nerve, surely, with which the Philosopher does.” With what nerve do you claim the Philosopher says that? What does he say? “Hear him speaking. In this commonwealth (he means the popular one) poor men do the administering, because they can have the free time since they receive a salary.” What then? “Therefore it is permissible for magistrates to receive a salary.” This is a rapacious argument, worthy of a raging tribune. For the Philosopher wanted nothing less than that magistrates take money, since he is most critical of this final kind of democracy (whence you take his words), since in it such men perform magistracies who are compelled to ask and hope for a salary. If you want me to prove this, take these topics for arguments. It is perilous for the commonwealth that a magistrate should receive a salary, therefore it is not permissible. Again, it is unjust and unseemly for the magistrates themselves to receive one, therefore it is not permissible. Third, it is a scandal for the citizens, full of oppression, therefore it is not permissible. Finally, it is not permissible because the acceptance of a salary enhances private rather than public and common good, and nothing more pestilent in the commonwealth can exist or be imagined. I prove that it is perilous to the commonwealth, since then affection rather than reason would reign in the magistrate. I prove that it is unseemly for the magistrates, since for this reason they are identified as corrupt and unjust. I prove that it is scandalous for the citizens, since they, oppressed by this example, become oppressors themselves. I prove that the public good is neglected while private good is enhanced, since the goods which should be flowing into the public treasury are snatched into the moneybags of a few men. Here can be added the severity of our ancestors in punishing this and divine truth in forbidding this crime, which two things being adduced in lieu of arguments should teach the magistrates of our times to close their eyes and ears to the imbibing of affections, and to avert and restrain both hands from the taking of money.

THE DISTINCTION

 

7. OBJECTION Under the popular constitution paupers perform magistracies, it is permissible for paupers to receive a salary, therefore it is permissible for magistrates to perform a magistracy. The major premise is Aristotle’s in his definition of democracy. The minor is proven, since without receiving a salary paupers cannot sustain the dignity of a magistracy.
RESPONSE The kingly saying of Pyrrhus, king of Thessaly, was I neither ask for gold, nor will you give me money. Fabricius is commended to posterity with just praises, since, being the poorest of all the magistrates among the Romans, he refused a king’s lavish gifts. Therefore I respond that in a democracy a magistrate should not be corrupted by money. For magistracy is situated and preserved, not in the receipt of a salary, which is an evil, but in performance of duty, which is a good. For the proving of the minor premise I say that at Athens Aristeides, at Rome Fabricius performed their offices more splendidly with the wealth of their minds than countless others who abounded in the riches of fortune.
OPPOSITION The labor of the magistrate in the performance of his office is great, therefore a reward is justly due him. And if it is due him, why should he not accept it when it is justly given?
RESPONSE This reasoning is a sophistry, derived from a change in the sense of a word. For nobody will deny a reward to a magistrate justly laboring, since he deserves it. But to have a venal office and prostitute his dignity for base gain like a whore is flatly denied to those performing magistracies.

Chapter vii

In a simple aristocracy is the good man the same as the good citizen?

RISTOTLE hastens directly onward in defining and dividing the kinds of the republic. For after he has divided the popular constitution and the power of the few into their forms, and exhibited the reasons why so many forms have arisen, he defines aristocracy (which now follows in its due order) and analogically distributes it into four species. I shall not linger in that contention between Aristotle and other philosophers about the number of republics which stands at the beginning of this chapter. Suffice it to say that some, such as Socrates and Plato, established four kinds of republic, others five, but Aristotle six (as enumerated in Book Three). There is no need for more words. Four species of aristocracy are enumerated here, but (if I may philosophize clearly) a distinction is to be made about aristocracy, that one kind is simple, another mixed. The simple is the administration of the commonwealth which simply consists of good men and exists according to virtue, in which (as the Philosopher teaches) the good man is simply the same as the good citizen. From which words is drawn the question about which I shall presently dispute. Mixed aristocracy is tripartite: one in which virtue is conjoined with wealth in the administration of the commonwealth, which form differs from oligarchy as that it has virtue as its object, and differs from the polity which is called by the common nam ofe the republic in that wealth alone is not held up for admiration. Another form is that in which virtue, wealth and the people hold sway jointly, which constitution is comprised of optimates, the few, and the power of the people, as once was the administration of the republic of Carthage. The final species of aristocracy is the constitution in which, no account being made of wealth, virtue and the the people possess the primacy, which form of administration is composed of optimates and the people. As Aristotle testifies here, the commonwealth of the Spartans was governed in this manner.
2. So much for the exposition of the text. The question is whether in simple aristocracy the good man is the same as the good citizen. Aristotle maintains that he is. “But what is he doing? In Book Three he taught the contrary.” He did not teach this. For although there, in speaking of the commonwealth sometimes comprised of bad men, he showed that one can be a good citizen, yet disputing absolutely and simply about aristocracy he wanted virtue alone to hold sway. Indeed he also expresses the wish there that virtue alone should govern. But since it is impossible but that the contagion of the vices exist in the civil body, as a confusion of the humors in the natural body, under this compulsion he established one virtue of office, and another of the good man. “What? If it cannot be but that contagion of the vices should be in the common run of mankind, why in this context does he speak of simple aristocracy, in which he requires all men to be simply the best? This is indeed to speak of a nonentity and, in my view, to catch at flies under the pretext of dealing with the most important things.” I indeed admit that simple aristocracy nowhere exists, I likewise admit that nowhere are all men earnest students of virtue. Yet mountains do not give birth to mice, nor is Aristotle’s contention about these matters an empty one, since he is diligently investigating not what exists but what should exist. Therefore he proposes this most noble form, to catch citizens rather than flies, that is, so that he might inspire men who are uncertainly wandering in the stadium of this life to the sincere pursuit of virtue. If we follow his wise advice, tell me the reason why true aristocracy could not flourish. For the power is not wanting, only corrupted will rejects it. So, with it posited that such an administration of the republic could exist, it follows that in it the good man is the same as the good citizen, which I prove in this way by a syllogism. In whatever constitution of the republic virtue alone is cultivated, in it the good man and the good citizen are the same, in simple aristocracy virtue alone is cultivated, therefore in simple aristocracy the good man and the good citizen are the same. That the major premise follows is proven, since with only virtue set before citizens’ eyes, it is necessary that all be good men, or indeed they are not citizens, since the essence of the commonwealth and the citizen exists exclusively in the adoration of virtue. Another reasoning is by way of a comparison, namely, since in other correct forms of republics it is most requisite that citizens become earnest students of virtue, it is probable that in aristocracy precaution is taken by just laws for this, that not only the magistrates who preside, but all citizens who are presided over should worship the divinity of virtue and piety. Furthermore, citizens should be good men in that republic in which virtue alone possesses the duties and dignities of the commonwealth, in simple aristocracy the duties and dignities of the commonwealth are owed only to virtue, therefore in simple aristocracy men are good and earnest. But in other administrations of republics the light of virtue is not always to be discerned, for sometimes nature prevails, and sometimes fortune: nature, when sons rule by succession, fortune, when the wealthy rule by oppression. Finally, no constitution of the republic is perfect in all ways in which citizens are not good men, simple aristocracy is in all ways perfect, therefore in aristocracy citizens are good men. The major premise is obvious, since virtue is the perfection of the commonwealth. The minor is proven, since simple aristocracy is defined by virtue alone, no account made of external matters.

THE DISTINCTION OF THE QUESTION

 

3. OBJECTION The forms of republics differ in species and nature, as the Philosopher taught above, therefore they cannot be intermixed, as he seems to demonstrate here. The reasoning is proven, since diverse species cannot be confounded and intermixed, as Porphry says.
RESPONSE The mixture of republics can be considered in two ways, either confusedly with respect their material, or distinctly with respect to their form. One republicc an exist made up out of others with respect to its material, as is evident in mixed forms of aristocracy. Yet one cannot consist of another with respect to its form, that is, that it might have the same rationale of government and administration.

OBJECTIONS TO THE QUESTION

OBJECTION Disputation about impossibilities is in vain, simple aristocracy cannot exist, therefore disputation about simple aristocracy is in vain. The major premise is obvious, since no profit comes of such disputation. The minor is agreed, since it is impossible that such a republic can ever exist.
RESPONSE I satisfied this objection in the first chapter of this Book, where I denied that disputation about a nonentity is not at all in vain, as is clear about a vacuum and infinity, and where I also maintained that such a republic is sagely proposed by the Philosopher as a target to aim at, for by striving towards it we may adhere to the mean.
OBJECTION In Book III Aristotle previously proved that a man can be a good citizen withoutmoral virtue, therefore the contrary is not to be taught in this context.
RESPONSE I have already satisfied this argument, for there he deals with the republic generally, here specifically with aristocracy.
OBJECTION In an aristocracy there are magistrates and offices who look to the utility of the commonwealth, therefore men can be good citizens in an aristocracy albeit they be bad men. The antecedent is clear, since in aristocracy there are leading men who deal with peace, soldiers who deal with war, judges who deal with the courts. The reasoning follows, since, granted these offices, citizens can comport themselves rightly in them, yet meanwhile live dishonest and unchaste lives.
RESPONSE Although in an aristocratic administration of the commonwealth these offices and dignities are requisite, yet in this constitution they who abandon virtue and holiness of life are not properly citizens, since in this species of commonwealth men are preferred, not because of goods of body or fortune, but exclusively because of goods of the mind.

THE CHAPTER’S DOUBTFUL QUESTION
It is more expedient for a simple aristocracy to flourish than a mixed one?

4. If human nature were not more tolerant of and drawn towards evil, this doubtful question would readily be solved. For who would then doubt that it is more expedient for a simple aristocracy to flourish in the administration of the commonwealth than a mixed one? But, since we are borne on a quicker foot to evil than to good, it is more expedient to prescribe a more lenient mode of living than to prescribe this best constitution. For, just as prudent physicians accommodate their medicines to the humors of the body, so political men fit their laws to the customs of the commonwealth. Therefore, inasmuch as this finicky age will not tolerate the bitter root and flavor of virtue in all its dealings, it is necessary that this root be swallowed sprinkled with the honey of wealth and the sweetness of other things. That is, since the morals of our times cannot admit simple aristocracy, in which virtue alone is cultivated, it is more expedient to appropriate for the public use a mixed one in which virtue is conjoined with other things. The reason is that, even if all men be fit for virtue, yet each and every man does not exist as its devotee. Simple aristocracy is therefore urged in vain, when every citizen is not compelled to virtue. Furthermore, since the dignity of the laws does not lie in this, that they behanded down justly, but in the fact they are obeyed, and when in a simple aristocracy the first condition exists, but the second is deficient (for the best laws are handed down, but none are observed), it is needful that the mixed aristocracy be preferred to the simple. When I say none are observed, I understand nothing less than that simple aristocracy is the best of all. Therefore what I mean is this, that Man’s infirmity is so great, and the contagion of sin so huge that he cannot observe the best laws handed down simply and absolutely. Furthermore, Man’s fall introduced a thousand evils, such as famine, plague, the sword and so forth, which call not only for the monk and the student of virtue, but for the political man and the man with experience of the commonwealth. And yet these external things are better handled in a mixed aristocracy than in a simple. Therefore it is more expedient for a mixed aristocracy than a simple one to flourish.
OBJECTION That which is best is to be preferred to that which is less good, simple aristocracy is best with respect to the mixed, therefore simple aristocracy is preferable. The major premise is Aristotle’s in Book III of the Topics. The minor is proven, since simple aristocracy cultivates virtue alone, since it only befits good and earnest men, and since it is not changed to the bad.
RESPONSE All these considerations rightly prove that simple aristocracy is better and also preferable with respect to the mixed, yet they do not prove that it is more expedient with respect to the utility of customs and the times, which must be taken into account in the foundation of the commonwealth.
OBJECTION Legislators should above all strive to make citizens excellent men, therefore they should also strive to prefer and give precedence to simple aristocracy, in which there exist only excellent men, above other forms of administration.
RESPONSEThey strive for both, but since they perceive so great a decline of virtue in Man that they cannot draw him in the direction they would wish, they sagely think it more expedient to approve mixed republics.

Chapter viii

Is the best institution of the laws that they should be obeyed after their passage?

paraphrase or exposition of this chapter consists of an account of the order of the things handled in it; the definition of that administration commonly called the polity or republic; and the Philosopher’s definition of the institution of laws, requisite for every well-governed commonwealth. The account of its order contains two things, an announcement of Aristotle’s intention, and the solution of a doubtful point. The announcement exists in these words, It remains for us to speak of that which is commonly called the polity and about tyranny. The solution of a doubtful point follows, where the Philosopher insinuates a tacit objection, namely that his order of handling the species of the republic appears to be confused, since its faults and deviations are discussed among the correct forms of the republic, as a description of the polity should follow after his handling of monarchy and aristocracy, but he interposes an analysis of popular power and the power of the few. He replies that this occurs because of the order of his discourse, since an explanation of popular power and the power of the few contributes greatly to the understanding of the polity, especially since this is nothing else than a certain mixture and composition of those elements. For the polity is defined as a certain universal administration or constitution of the commonwealth in which paupers together with the wealthy regard honor, wealth and liberty as standards and goals. Hence in the text it is not inappropriately called by Aristotle a kind of confusion and mixture of oligarchy and democracy. But, you will say, oligarchy and democracy are faults of the polity, therefore the polity cannot be composed of them, as if they were its parts. I reply that oligarchy and democracy are not principles of its constitution, but causes of understanding with respect to the polity. It is agreed they are not principles of its constitution, since a correct form of the republic cannot be made out of incorrect ones; but I prove that these are causes of its understanding, since if they go unappreciated it cannot be correctly known and demonstrated. If you insist that this constitution is defined as a mixture of the two, and so conclude that it exists composed out of them as out of parts, again I reply that, as a mixture contains within itself elements with respect to its material and virtue, but not with respect to its form, so the polity is made up of other forms of the republic which possess an accounting of its material but not a distinction of its form in this very mixture. Thus Aristotle distinguishes the defined polity according to the opinion of the old philosophers, which they commonly used to identify as a republic when it inclined towards democracy, but as the best administration when it inclined towards oligarchy. For the ancients regarded nobility as a virtue, and used to define it as nothing else but old money. But the Philosopher says that it is impossible that a polity tending towards oligarchy can be called the power of the best men or an aristocracy. For these two constitutions have different goals and ends: affluence of property is set up and established as a goal for oligarchy, but only virtue is for aristocracy. Furthermore, since in oligarchy there is not such a pious institution of the laws as in the administration of optimates, these philosophers’ error is clear. For in aristocracy honors are only extended to the citizens by virtue’s hand, but in oligarchy wealth is sough aftert, as is liberty in democracy, and in accordance with these two, viz. wealth and liberty, laws are ordained with an appearance and supposition of the good. But, as the Philosopher brilliantly teaches here, the best institution of the laws is not for them to be inscribed on tablets, but that the be justly obeyed by the citizens, which opinion of the Philosopher I take in this place in lieu of a question, and will now interpret it in a few words.
2. A certain wise men, sent to Sparta to observe by what laws and institutions that commonwealth was governed, returned to his nation after several years and was summoned to the senate to give an account of his journey. Asked how the Spartans administered their republic, he produced in the senate a rope, a whipping-fork, a sword, and other exquisite instruments of torture, saying These are the laws of the Spartans, in these are placed that commonwealth’s safety and administration, as if he were saying, Oh Athenians, we pass many fine laws, taking much delight in their names and titles, but the Spartans surpass us in this, that they must obey their ancestors’ decrees justly and severely. By this example it is crystal-clear that laws have their force and life, not in their institution, but rather in their sincere observation. For, just as money placed in a chest is without use to Man if it is not spent, so laws chiseled on bronze bring no profit to the commonwealth if they are not obeyed as they should be. Laws indeed are mute magistrates and, as it were, inanimate instruments of the republic, which nevertheless have voice and life if citizens can be impelled to obey them by the judge’s severity. What good does a medicine do, if it is not applied? Why are laws made, if they are not put into practice? Laws are not instituted so that they may be present among us, but that they might preside. But they cannot preside if the citizens are not pressed to obey them. Hence it is to be understood that privileges, dispensations, and shrewd and canny interpretations of the laws should not be tolerated save for the rarest and most urgent of causes. For to concede these things is to open windows in the commonwealth for its great ruin. For example, there is a law that grain is not to be exported to foreign nations, the sovereign is petitioned, a dispensation is granted, ships are laden, and thus for a while our enemies are glutted and our citizens go a-starving. So you want the laws to live? Let the sword be drawn, let it strike down rascals, let it not spare men of high, middle, or low degree. See to it that your laws don’t just catch flies. For for it is that important that in the commonwealth not only rabbits but also lions and eagles; that is, wealthy and powerful men, must dread the voice and severity of the laws. Let the voice of law be a terror, let the punishment of the law be a thunderbolt. I am not Draco the Athenian, nor do I want laws to be written in blood. But I would wish this, that all men be deterred from wrongdoing by the voice and punishment of the law. For, to conclude with the Philosopher, the best institution of the laws is not just that they exist, but after their passage they be obeyed.

THE DISTINCTION OF THE QUESTION

AN OBJECTION TO THE FIRST PART OF THE CHAPTER

3. OBJECTION Faults of the republic are posterior to those forms from which they deviate, oligarchy and popular power are faults of the polity, therefore they are posterior, and so are to be treated in a posterior position.
RESPONSE Oligarchy and popular power are not faults of the polity, unless confusedly. For distinctly they are referred to other forms of the commonwealth. Furthermore, I reply that the reasoning does not follow, since, in accordance with the order of the discourse, evils and things to be avoided are demonstrated in an earlier place.

AN OBJECTION TO THE DEFINITION OF THE POLITY

OBJECTION If the polity is a mixture of popular power and that of the few, then it exist composed of them, which are, as it were, its parts, but this absurd, therefore it is not a mixture of them. The major premise is clear, since a mixture is a union of things that are capable of being mixed. The minor is proven, since a correct constitution of the republic cannot coalesce out of incorrect ones.
RESPONSE These two constitutions are considered in two ways, either confusedly with respect to their material, and thus they are parts of the polity, or distinctly with respect to their form, and thus they are not. For they are present in the polity as intermingled elements, that is, according to their material, but not according to their form, since in the polity there are wealthy men, as in oligarchy, and poor ones, as in democracy, but the same administration of rich and poor is not maintained in the former as in the latter.

OBJECTIONS TO THE QUESTION

OBJECTION Aristotle previously taught that during a transformation of the commonwealth it is requisite that the old laws should endure albeit they are not observed, therefore the institution of laws in not such that ,once enacted, they should always be obeyed.
RESPONSE Indeed he has previously taught that during a transformation of the commonwealth the old laws are to be retained, not because the old laws should not be observed, but lest the people grow enraged with their old laws suddenly abolished. Therefore this argument does not hang together, Aristotle wished that the old laws be obtained during a transformation of the commonwealth, therefore he did not want laws to be obeyed.
OBJECTION Sometimes laws are depraved and unjust, and their abolition is more to be hoped for than their observation. Therefore the best institution of the laws is not that, once passed, they should be obeyed. The antecedent is clear in oligarchy and other incorrect forms of the commonwealth.
RESPONSE Unjust laws have a twofold respect, either towards the correct or towards the depraved commonwealth. If you consider the latter, their abrogation is simply more to be hoped for than their observation, but if you consider the former it is not the same, in part since the good of such a commonwealth is specious and false, and partly since evils should sometimes be tolerated, even if the commonwealth is only in part a good one.

THE CHAPTER’S DOUBTFUL QUESTION
Is it permissible to obey laws badly passed?

4. Really? Can it be that laws badly legislated can justly be obeyed? Is that what you teach, Philosopher? Is this the honor you bestow on virtue? You badly inserted this parenthesis in your text. For that which is unjust should not be justly and honorably approved. “You are not paying attention to what I mean in the text. For I do not mean that laws badly passed are simply unjust. Nevertheless I maintain this is possible, that laws badly passed should be obeyed.” If you ask the reason, it should be considered that the institution of laws is either absolute, when the best laws are established, or comparatively, when they appear to be the best ex hypothesi and by supposition. For example, in monarchy and simple aristocrac, the best laws are legislated, but in mixed forms of the best they are often created by supposition, and these indeed are often badly legislated, yet justly obeyed. The reason is that the administrations in which they are legislated often aim at the common good. But to make the matter clearer, suppose a law to be badly legislated that it is permissible to increase one’s fortune by moneylending (and this indeed is badly legislated, if you consider the court of conscience), yet it is permissible to obey this law, since otherwise neither can citizens’ insatiable covetousness and greed be satisfied, nor can the public good of the commonwealth be preserved. Therefore it is sometimes better to tolerate an evil resulting from badly legislated laws than to permit the ruin of the commonwealth.

THE DISTINCTION

5. OBJECTION It is unjust to obey badly legislated laws, therefore it is not permissible. The antecedent is proven, since badly legislated laws always permit that which is contrary and repugnant to justice, for example usury.
RESPONSE Badly legislated laws do not always permit injustice, if you consider either the intent of the legislator or the preservation of the commonwealth in which they are legislated.
OBJECTION In Book III, chapter i of the Ethics Aristotle teaches that it is better to suffer extreme torture than to commit evil, therefore it is neither permissible to good magistrates to enact such laws, nor for good citizens to obey them when enacted.
RESPONSE I deny it is simply bad to enact such laws, or to obey them when enacted, if you have regard for the end and good of the commonwealth.

Go to the second part of Book IV