To see a commentary note, click on a blue square. To see the Latin text, click on a green square.

Chapter ix

In the polity should the sons of the wealthy and the poor be educated in the same way?

NASMUCH as in nearly every nation a mixed or common administration of the commonwealth is practiced (for very rarely does a simple monarchy or aristocracy make an appearance), here Aristotle not unadvisedly hastens to say more about the polity, a common mixed form of administration. So after showing that the polity is nothing else but a mixture of popular power and the power of the few, now he demonstrates, briefly and in separate sections, the nature of its composition and the number number of methods by which it exists. And since as it were, there are three contributions in every commonwealth,of judgment, consultation, and election, from them he produces three methods by which the polity exists. First, he says, oligarchy has this law about judgment, that the wealthy, must come when summoned, under penalty of a fine, to participate in the court and judgment of the commonwealth. But in popular power the law commands that poor men must attend the senate, under the same penalty. The polity observes a mean between these two extremes, namely that both poor and rich should have open access to the judgments of the republic, and this is the first method of its mixture. A second method is one by which a mean is adopted regarding consultation, namely that not just the wealthy man, who has a great pile and estate, nor just the pauper, who has a smal onel, may come to an assembly concerning public affairs, but, all men may freely come to it, as long as proportion regarding their condition is observed. The method has regard for the creation and election of the magistrate, in which the ambition of the nobility (who wish only the well-to-do to hold first place in the republic) is restrained, and the sedition of the multitude (who wish this only for the poor) is repressed. Therefore the best mixture of a republic out of the constitution of the few and the popular constitution exists when a mean and, as it were, a contribution is adopted out of both, and this with respect to judgment, consultation and election, upon which the pivot of the commonwealth revolves. By this threefold method of composition, or rather this mean between oligarchy and democracy being granted, the Philosopher now shows its end and goal, that it be a kind of standard and norm by which we may determine whether a polity, commonly called by the name of a republi,c is rightly composed out of these elements or not. He says that the surest indication that a polity is well-composed is when now it seems to be a popular power, and now that of the few, but is in actuality neither. The reason is that the medium, when compared to either extreme, appears to defer to the rationale of both, but nevertheless is a thing distinct from both in its nature and species. For, in the manner that there exists in the body a mixture with respect to its elements, so in the republic there exists a mixture with respect to those administrations out of which it is composed. Thus, however, it differs, that it comprehends within itself certain powers of both, which is declared in the text by the example of the Spartans, whose republic seemed at one moment to be a popular power, and at another to be the power of the few. For many men called it a democracy, and many an oligarchy: a democracy, since in it the sons of the rich and the poor were likewise nursed, reared, educated, clothed, and elected to magistracies; an oligarchy, since it dignities were conferred by election rather than lot, since the power of death and exile were in the hands of the few, which two things together with many other decrees and institutions in that polity seem to advertise oligarchy. But if you consider the matter more closely you will understand that the polity was neither of these, but it existed per se and by its own essence as a distinct form and constitution. For just as an image comes about thanks to wax and a seal, and yet is neither called the wax nor the seal, so a republic is constituted out of democracy and oligarchy, and yet is defined as neither the one nor the other.
2. This is a summary of the things treated in this chapter. Now follows the question, which is whether the sons of wealthy men and paupers ought to be educated in the same way in a polity. The Spartans (as Aristotle teaches here) raised, brought up and educated the sons of paupers and the well-to-do in a similar way, and indeed among them the wealthy man was in no respect more distinguished nor illustrious than the pauper, either in youth or in manhood. For the untying of this knot we must first bear in mind that the responsibility for bringing up boys and young men does not pertain only to their personal parents, but also to the magistrates, since the the hope and crop of the future commonwealth reposes in their tender years. In the second place, we must consider that the education of boys has regard for four things, namely diet, dress, art, and physical exercise, for the guidance of which is required the great prudence of the magistrate. For a light diet makes them fit, decorous dress makes them humble, art makes them learned, and physical exercise makes them bold citizens. Thirdly, we must consider whether within the polity it is expedient to keep both the sons of the rich and the poor in the same condition regarding these things. I maintain the negative. For although in democracy (in which the equal freedom and free equality of each and every citizen is aimed at), they are in the same condition, lest anything seem to be personal and private, nevertheless in this polity and well-regulated republic it is absurd and altogether foreign to reason that no distinction of breeding and blood is made regarding diet, dress and art. This can be proven in many ways, but I shall be content with a few arguments, of which the first is taken from the force of nature, the second from the force of justice, the third from the end, and the fourth from necessity. From the force of nature, which (as is proven above) has granted the commonwealth masters and slaves, fathers and sons, wives and husbands, which distinction of persons she would doubtless not have given if she had not had foresight for any discrimination of things in their preservation. For why should individuals be called masters and slaves, noble and lowborn, by dint of human nature, if the same reckoning is not the be maintained at all in the education of the sons of either sort? Nature has granted greater brightness to the sun than the moon, a more ample honor to master than slave, which is assuredly impossible if under the same star and according to the same fortune the sons of slaves and masters are to have the same lot of education in the commonwealth. This same thing is proven by the force of justice, since civil justice imitates nature. Therefore if nature wished this distinction, justice will not refuse it. But this distinction cannot be discerned if diverse seeds of education are not sown at a tender age. The third argument is taken from the end, since the sons of the rich and the poor are destined for different ends and tasks in the republic. It is therefore necessary that they not be molded in exactly the same way. The antecedent is clear, since in a political constitution honor is conferred on the sons of the noble and the well-to-do, but the burden of the republic is placed upon the sons of the poor. For the forme sit on the quarterdeck grasping the rudder, whereas the latter climb the mast and laboriously ply the oars amidst the waves.
3. Here, however, I do not approve that oligarchic decree, or rather that oligarchic paradox, that only the sons of the well-do-do and the noble are to be instructed in the liberal arts. In his book De Beneficiis Seneca rightly said, If anybody should think that servitude befalls the whole man, he is mistaken, since the better part of him is always exempted, namely his soul. Therefore learning and the path of virtue is to be withheld from no man. Indeed it is unjust and quite contrary to nature that even the spark of a natural inclination towards the good be extinguished. Therefore if sons of paupers be born with fertile wits, it is harmful if they be herded away from academic campuses to the dunghill, from the Muses to the plow. If anyone should say here that paupers lack the wherewithal by which their sons might dwell at Athens amidst the Muses, I respond that this ought to be the concern of the commonwealth, that it should not neglect, not scorn the root and branch of its own preservation. If it were to do so, it should wholly remove each and every pauper’s son from the pursuit of philosophy. Assuredly thrice, four times blessed is England, our sweetest nation, for having so many right noble colleges, so many august institutions of learning consecrated to God for the use of paupers! May Christ bring about that they ever flourish, safe and unshaken, and that within them may live sons of poor men, earnestly instructed and educated! This which is objected is foolish, namely that the study of wisdom rightly separates the sons of the wealthy from the sons of the poor. Even more foolish is that opinion that the sweetness of the Muses is so great that, when digested by the sons of paupers, it makes them contract an intoxication with the goodly arts, so that few are left to ply the mechanical arts and rustic trades. Oh would that sons of peers and paupers would philosophize until they could be said to have been wholly overwhelmed with their intoxication with the goodly arts!
4. But what am I doing? My final argument is from necessity, since their education ought to be more gentle in whom more repose the hope and anchor of the republic , the hope and anchor more repose in the sons, therefore their education should be more gentle. The assumption of this syllogism is proven, since either by the lot of succession or the consent of the multitude the well-to-do are borne to the pinnacles of the commonwealth more often than are the poor, atop which they are wont to exist either as lights for salvation or thunderbolts for destruction. For, armed by public and private wealth, they are able to do more good or work more harm. Therefore if you have regard for the polity, let Caesar’s son be delicately reared so that he may live long for nature. Let him be educated so he may long live for the commonwealth. Let him be clad in purple, so that he may be honored by the citizen. Let him be exercised in the gymnasium, so he may be dreaded by the enemy.

THE DISTINCTION OF THE QUESTION

 

OBJECTIONS TO THE QUESTION

5. OBJECTION In the excellent polity of the Spartans the sons of the rich and poor were instructed in the same way, as is clear in the text. Therefore in this context it is unadvisedly defended that the opposite be done in the polity.
RESPONSE An example does not always have the force of law. This reasoning therefore does not hang together, for it is from a secondary consideration (as they say) to a simple one. Nor in this context am I inquiring what has been done, but what should be done.
OBJECTION In a polity democracy should be visible, as Aristotle requires, in democracy the sons of rich and poor should be educated in the same way, therefore in the polity the same form of education should be observed. The major and minor premises are in the text.
RESPONSE Something can appear in two ways, either in potential, such as an element in a mixture and democracy in the political constitution of the republic with which we are now dealing, or in actuality, and thus the Philosopher does not require that popular power appear in a polity.
OBJECTION Equality should be observed in every constitution of the republic, as Aristotle teaches in Book II of the Politics. Therefore it appears requisite that the education of all men be similar. The argument is proven, since if education should be unequal, the proportion of equity is not observed.
RESPONSE Equality is twofold, either pound for pound (as they say) or of justice. The former is not requisite in the commonwealth, that each and every man be equal in dignity, but the latter is requisite, that each man is given is own in proportion to his merit. Therefore, since the same account is not taken of rich and poor in the polity, there need not be the same for the education of sons of both degrees.
OBJECTION A similarity of habits and pursuits is greatly to be hoped for within the polity, if the sons of rich and poor are educated in the same way a similarity of habits and pursuits ensues, therefore the sons of rich and poor should be educated in the same way. The major premise is agreed, since true friendship (said to be the preserver of the commonwealth) consists of a similarity of habits and pursuits. The minor premise is obvious, since education is the root and foundation of future life.
RESPONSE Similarity of habits and pursuits arises from internal causes and first beginnings, not external ones. Diet, dress, and exercise of the body are external things, art and and virtue are the internal seedbeds of our habits. These two latter things produce true similarity and concord of citizens. Wherefore, even if the proportion of diet, dress, and exercise be unlike, in virtue there can exist a most genuine agreement of habits and pursuits.
OBJECTION Sons of rich and poor ought thus to be educated in a well-regulated commonwealth that they become good citizens, the path of virtue is single and simple, therefore sons of rich and poor should be educated the same way. The major premise is Aristotle’s in Book I of the Ethics. The minor is in Book II, where he teaches that the good is one, but that evil is infinite. Furthermore, virtue demands in all men a light diet, as does temperance; she demands decorous dress, as does modesty; she demands useful art, as does prudence; she demands physical exercise, as does fortitude. Therefore a similarity of education is requisite in external things as well as internal ones.
RESPONSE All these things argue that diligent care is to be taken that both the sons of the poor and the rich are molded to virtue, yet they to do note entirely conclude this is to be done in the same way. For example, at a tender age sons of poor men ought to be exhorted to frugality, but sons of the rich to magnificence.

THE CHAPTER’S DOUBTFUL QUESTION
In a polity is a fine justly to be imposed on those who refuse office?

6. Nowadays very rarely do we swim against the current of honor. For who rejects gold when it is offered? Who refuses the duty and office of dignity? But if there should be some Heraclitus who would prefer to play with children than attend the Athenians’ senate, if there should be some Themistocles who would be happier going to Hell than to a courtroom, let him plead his cause here, and surely there will be another to cheerfully occupy his bench. But to deal with you seriously, Fabricius, you must go from your plow to the Forum; Appius, you grave old man, you must go from your threshing-floor to the theater. Your rustic affairs should not excuse you, Fabricius; your blindness and white hairs should not excuse you, Appius. The nation calls, you must hasten. It offers you office, you cannot refuse. So if, having been called, you should refuse to come, justly indeed let a fine be imposed, not unfairly let a punishment be inflicted upon you. Why are you standing still? No reason for you to shake your hoary heads so, I cannot delay, wherefore I prove this to you with some points. The nation is the common parent of all men, for whom one should die, therefore it is not allowed us to resist and refuse when she summons us to office under a penalty. Furthermore he is deserving of a penalty who does not offer his aid to the commonwealth when asked, he who refuses his office refuses aid to his commonwealth when asked, therefore he who refuses office is deserving of a penalty. Also, if it were permissible for worthy men to refuse offices, the republic would often be treated shamefully, this would deserve a penalty, therefore that too. Next, why (as Aristotle says here) is a fine imposed on the wealthy if they fail to perform the duty of a judge, if in the polity, a superior constitution of the commonwealth, the selfsame thing were not permitted? Finally, I greatly wonder why you are not more quickly moved, since the laws of virtually every commonwealth and nation have concluded that this penalty is most just? For the Spartans adjudged that those guilty of this crime to be worthy of exile, the Romans adjudged them worthy of deprivation of citizenship, the Athenians adjudged them worthy of death.

THE DISTINCTION IS CLEAR

7. OBJECTION The honors of the commonwealth are refused rarely, if ever. Therefore, just as it is otiose to apply a remedy when disease is not oppressing the patient, so it is vain to appoint a penalty when the crime is not committed.
RESPONSE Just as physicians are wont not only to cure diseases, but are also careful to take precautions lest they occur, so statesmen not only oppose present evils, but by threatening a penalty strive to deter citizens from future ones. And although a refusal of civil office containing any office or scent of profit rarely occurs, yet if it should hurt, an abundant caution of the law will do no harm.
OBJECTION The Philosopher has already approved that old men are to an extent not citizens, and that they are freed from the offices of the republic. There it is permissible for some men to refuse.
RESPONSEThere, in the opinion of the interpreters, Aristotle has in mind decrepit, feeble and delirious old men. It is further to be hoped that the very elderly be immune, or at least that they be fined with a lighter penalty — as men who refuse the Lord Mayorship of London are fined £200!

Chapter x

Is it permissible to kill a tyrant who has legitimately succeeded his father?

T this point the Philosopher says that a brief discourse about tyranny must be delivered, since of all the forms (both correct and incorrect) this is deemed by far the worst, and most unworthy of the philosophical art. For it is a blot upon kingship, and the bane of justice and equity. But just as in medicine it is necessary to describe disease as well as health, so in political science one must describe not only the republic but also its error. For one must speak of tyranny as if it were a canker, and of the tyrant as the vulture of the commonwealth. Here Aristotle repeats a little of what has been said about tyranny above. We defined, he says, the species of tyranny, of which one was in use among the barbarians, and another among the Greeks. For the first, that of the barbarians, was transmitted by succession and lasted for life, and the second, that of the Greeks, was neither transmitted by succession nor for life, but was conceded for a predetermined amount of time. These two forms of administration can be compared to monarchy in two respects, and in two other respects to tyranny: with monarchy, first, since it employs laws and, second, because it is exercised over willing, or at least unresisting citizens; with tyranny, first, because in it government is not paternal but that of the slave-owner, and, second, that all things are referred to private convenience rather than to the public good of the commonwealth. But these two species are mixed, not simple, and are analogous, not true. Third in the text follows the expressed image of a monster, the true species and form of tyranny. This has three blemishes and faults. The first clings to its brow, since, like a bold harlot, it apes royal majesty, though it is its greatest opposite in all things. The second is in its mind (if it has a mind), since in it rules rage rather than reason, lust rather than equity. The third is discerned in its ironclad teeth and claws, for it devours all things with the one, and rips and rends all with the other. Therefore this species is wholly monstrous, fair in name alone. And so Aristotle concludes with these words: Wherefore it (he means tyranny) governs unwilling subjects, no freeborn man can bear such a government with equanimity.
2. From which dictum now arises the question whether it is permissible to kill a tyrant who has legitimately succeeded his father. To hit my target with a single shot, I assuredly do not think it is permissible. But, you will say, Aristotle plainly implies the contrary in this context, for thus he speaks: no freeborn man can bear such a government with equanimity. What do you gather from these words? “That it is permissible to kill a tyrant by any means at all.“ You gather wrongly, for although a man cannot bear it with equanimity, yet he should bear and tolerate it, compelled by the force of justice. “You are certainly mad. For elsewhere Aristotle teaches that is permissible to kill a tyrant.”” Rather you are mad, for although he may indeed teach that it is permissible to kill a tyrant, yet in that passage he does not distinctly mean that it is permissible to kill a tyrant who has legitimately succeeded. Therefore these arguments move me little: no freeborn man can bear a tyrant with equanimity: therefore it is permissible to kill a tyrant, and again, it is is permissible to kill a tyrant who gains government for himself by force, therefore it is permissible to kill a tyrant legitimately succeeding his father. But, circumlocutions aside, I shall contend with arguments. A legitimate king should not be killed: a tyrant legitimately succeeding his father is a king, therefore a tyrant legitimately succeeding his father should not be killed. The major premise is conceded by the consent of all philosophers, since the name of king is sacred, and in him is perceived the image of God, justice, and the entire commonwealth. The minor is proven, since succession has conferred right of rule, which can indeed be stained by Man’s sin, but cannot be justly taken away by the will of the multitude. Furthermore, it is in no wise permitted to kill a private man, therefore much less is it permitted to kill a tyrant legitimately succeeding his father. The antecedent is clear, since human life is dear to the commonwealth and should not be extinguished unlawfully. The reasoning holds, since what is not permitted in the case of the lesser will not be permitted in the case of the greater, and it is greater to kill a tyrant than a private man. Also, it is impermissible to do that which engenders sudden movements of sedition in the commonwealth and renders all monarchy uncertain, the killing of a tyrant legitimately succeeding his father begets these two monstrosities and maladies, therefore such a killing should not be tolerated. Nobody doubts the major premise, and I prove the minor, since when a king is killed by violence the multitude is astonished, a great upheaval of things ensues, and also when this window is once open that it is permissible to kill, the best of monarchies are endangered, since in no republic are absent men like Brutus and Cassius, who, under tyranny’s pretest, will stab merciful Caesars in the very senate. Next, every king who legitimately succeeds is either good or bad, he is either the right hand of God or the left, therefore it is not permitted to kill him. I prove this reasoning since, if he be good, it is horrid to kill him; but if he be bad, to kill him is to place no dependence on divine providence, which sometimes bids kings like Julian, sometimes kings like Justinian and Constantine to preside over the people. Add to this that, according to the Philosopher, it is not permissible to bear arms against a tyrant legitimately succeeding, therefore neither is it permissible to kill him. The antecedent is proven, since it belongs to providence rather to correct kings by counsel than to kill them by conspiracies. Finally, the examples and evidence of antiquity for the most part confirm my position in this matter: under Nero, Caligula, Heliogabalus and other tyrannical monsters there lived the most blessed Fathers, and none of these entered into a conspiracy. David, that anointed king, did not lay a hand on Saul, Elijah did not destroy Ahab with fire, Moses and Aaron fled Pharoah’s monstrous cruelty, but left to God the vengeance for their oppression.

THE DISTINCTION OF THE QUESTION

 

3. OBJECTION It is permissible to uproot the greatest evil from the commonwealth by any means at all, tyranny which insinuates itself into kingship under the veil of succession is the greatest evil, therefore it is permissible to kill by any means the tyrant who insinuates himself into kingship under the veil of succession. The major premise is agreed, since the greatest tyranny, creeping further abroad, would corrupt the commonwealth not otherwise than a putrid part would corrupt the entire body. The minor is proven, since the tyrant who insinuates himself into kingship under the veil of succession is no different than a viper that devours its own mother.
RESPONSE First I must answer your major premise, namely that I have doubts about the method of removing evil from the commonwealth, nay, I maintain that this is not to be done in any way at all in accordance with any man’s will, but rather that the greatest evil is to be eradicated from the commonwealth in any way at all in accordance with the judgment and counsel of wised men. But the counsel of wise men does not bid that the king who turns out to be a tyrant should be stabbed by the daggers of Brutus and Cassius, but that, the senate having been convened, the more prudent portion of the multitude should be consulted about a sensible and just means of his removal.
OBJECTION It is permissible to kill a man conspiring against his nation by any means, therefore it is much more permissible to kill a king practicing tyranny under the veil of succession. The reasoning from the lesser to the greater holds. For Catiline harms the republic much less than Caesar, the private enemy than the tyrannical ruler.
RESPONSE The logic is not the same, whether you look at the example of those men or at the peril of the commonwealth. For if a private enemy should be removed, only a part is cut off. But if a king should be killed, the entire commonwealth is brought into harm’s way, not because it is freed from evil, but because with this evil thus removed a danger of sedition is created. Therefore I reply that the reasoning adduced does not hold, since the comparison of circumstances in these two situations is not the same, as is requisite in a reasoning that works by way of a comparison.
OBJECTION A good king is a man in all ways worthy to live and be preserved. Therefore under guise of a kingship the tyrants proves himself worthy to die and be killed in any manner you choose. The antecedent is Aristotle’s in Book III. The argument holds from contraries, since king and tyrant are opposite in all things, as is proven above.
RESPONSE We must consider the place, not the man, we must consider Phalaris’ office rather than Phalaris. I admit that a man thus occupying the kingdom is sometimes worthy of a capital punishment, but because of the reverence and majesty of his place and office the sword of the executioner or the assassin is not to be stained with the blood of Caesar the tyrant. Therefore king and tyrant are not altogether opposites, since the agree in their place and their office.
OBJECTION It is permissible to kill an unjust and felonious king, therefore it is much more permissible to kill a tyrant, even if he has invaded the republic under the guise of succession. The antecedent is proven by the example of Abarctus, who killed Sardanapalus, of Otanes who killed Magus, of the the many men who in Book X chapter iv Aristotle records to have killed their Caesars. The reasoning holds from the greater to the less, since it is a greater thing to kill a king than a tyrant.
RESPONSE We are inquiring de iure, not de facto. I recognize that a thousand Caesars have been removed from this life by the sword, by poison, and in six hundred other ways, yet I deny that this occurred at all justly, albeit in this wrongdoing those murders may possess the color and show of virtue. Therefore the antecedent of this enthymeme is to be denied, since it is impermissible to kill an unjust king while he occupies the throne of the commonwealth.
OBJECTION It is permissible to kill bad kings for the sake of God and religion, therefore it is permissible to kill tyrants for the same reason. The antecedent is clear from the testimony of sacred philosophy, in which Ehud is praised because he killed Eglon king of the Moabites, Jael because he killed Sisera, Iehu because he killed Joramum, and Judith because she killed Holophernes.
RESPONSE Beware lest you rashly and dangerously convert an example into a prescript. Notice that Christ gave Caesar tribute, not poison. The thing that happen thanks to God’s secret motion, His command and impulse do not always have the force of law. It pleased Him that Elijah called down fire from heaven to kill the worshippers of Baal, it pleased Him that Elisha summoned cruel bears out of the forest to harry the mocking boys. Yet it did not please Him that Peter draw his sword, let alone that he sever the thread of Caesar’ life. If princes turn out to be tyrants, they are God’s left hand; if they remain good, they are not unjustly called God’s right hand. It is therefore a furious, inexpiable crime to cut of these hands, and not to await God’s will with patience. But, you will say, better for one man to perish than legions. What you say is true, if God’s left hand be not on that one man which should not be cut off. But who are these men whom you say die? If they be good, they do not die; if they be bad, it is their crime that they should die. For it is God’s just judgment if there be no good fruit in Sulla’s harvest, that is, if in the fires of persecution they do not lose slag of their own wrongdoings.

Chapter xi

Is the commonwealth composed of middling citizens politically preferable to other forms of the republic?
Are the needy or beggars to be tolerated in the commonwealth?

T the end of the preceding chapter no doubtful question is discussed, as is my usual custom, since this treatment of tyrants is most brief, and, as Aristotle says, requires no longer discourse. Therefore I come to what follows, namely that I might demonstrate what is the best republic, yet not exactly and simply, but according to that rationale and method which suits most commonwealths. For it is one thing to define the best republic absolutely, another to define it comparatively and respectively. The absolutely best is established as a goal, but is rarely attained, but the comparatively best is defined as a kind of mean, and in a number of places is achieved. Therefore after the Philosopher has given a description of the absolutely best (be it monarchy or aristocracy, which are the same with respect to the rationale of virtue), and has set forth all the forms of correct administration and their faults, it is now congruous and agreeable for him to delineate the commonly best, that is, such as can be participated in by most men, which demands neither the exact rule of virtue nor an exquisite discipline of education. Aristotle says this, not because he does not believe that the simply best republic to be that in which virtue alone governs, but because, with the theater of human life placed before his eyes, he observed that it is impossible for heroic virtue to be piously worshipped by all the men politically running in this stadium; nor, if you watch life’s political tragedy, does this follow of necessity that the best men are the best citizens. Indeed, it often happens that students of virtue are ignorant about the commonwealth.
2. Here, therefore, the Philosopher establishes a middling and easy way, which he calls best in a certain respect. Hence arises the question I am now handling, namely, is the commonwealth composed of middling citizens preferable to the other forms of the republic? Aristotle maintains that this is the best to be chosen. But here we must make a distinction that citizens are called middling in four ways, being men who hold to the mean and prescript between virtue and vice, or between honor and disgrace, or between great wealth and poverty, or finally between liberty and servitude. In the context the mean is considered in all these ways, but most of all between prosperity and want. The Philosopher proceeds by demonstrating his proposition, first generally, and then specifically. Generally, in this way: the best men are not always knowledgeable about the commonwealth, felonious men are the plague of the commonwealth, therefore a mean between the both is to be observed. Furthermore, those who are distinguished for their nobility are often haughty and peevish, but those who suffer under ignominy are often malevolent and spiteful, therefore the best administration is that which holds to a mean between the two. The same is to be said about wealth and poverty, freedom and servitude, and about their mean, because those who attain this in political administration are said to live most happily and safely. For, as the Philosopher says here, those who live amidst an excess of wealth or of friends refuse to obey commandment, nor do they know how to command, for they are soft, unschooled, contumacious, envious and hated by all, and therefore the commonwealth which consists of means is deemed the best.
3. This can be demonstrated specifically from a number of arguments in the text, in this way. That commonwealth is best which has the life of its citizens conjoined with virtue, the commonwealth consisting of middling citizens has their life conjoined with virtue, therefore the commonwealth consisting of middling citizens is the best. Again, that commonwealth whose citizens readily obey the dictate of reason is commonly the best, that commonwealth which consists of those who neither exceed nor are deficient in prosperity is such a one, therefore the commonwealth which consists of middling citizens is the best. Third, the best commonwealth is composed of equal and similar citizens, middling citizens are equal and similar, therefore the best commonwealth is composed of middling citizens. Fourth, where there is no plotting, no envy, no thirst or greed for the property of other men, there is the best commonwealth, there is nothing of the kind among mediocre and middling citizens, therefore the best commonwealth is composed of middling citizens. Fifth, that which derives its origin and preservation from nature is indeed the best, such is the commonwealth composed of middling citizens, as is proven in the text by the testimony of Phocylides, therefore the commonwealth consisting of middling citizens is the best of all. Sixth, the city which is not roiling with sedition is the best, the middling commonwealth roils with no sedition, therefore the middling commonwealth is the best. Finally, the commonwealth possesses the most excellent legislators is the best, the middling commonwealth has the most excellent legislators, as is proven by the examples of Solon, Lycurgus, Charondas, sand others mentioned in the text, therefore the middling commonwealth is best. These things being posited, Aristotle compares other forms of popular republics with this administration that he has now proved to be the most excellent, and says they are better or worse to the extent they more or less appear to come close to this one.
4. A second question, which is whether beggars and the needy are to be tolerated in the commonwealth, depends on these words in the text, Therefore in all cities there are three parts of the commonwealth: some are quite well-to-do and prosperous, some most needy and poverty-stricken, and a third class is middle between these, and a little further down, it is clear that of the degrees of property-holding the mean is the best, for it can be most readily induced to obey reason. He adds the cause, inasmuch as he who is excessively poor (i. e., a beggar) obeys reason with difficulty, since, just as the wealthy are often petulant and stubborn, so beggars and the wretched are for the most part lightheaded and malicious. But, lest this evil befall the commonwealth, in Book VI chapter v Aristotle advises that the wel-to-do, who have heaped up and amassed great sums and possess a great opportunity for commerce, should support the needy with the necessities of life and grant them charity. And in this the Philosopher indeed gives sound advice. For the commonwealth ought to be happy, therefore it is not fitting for its citizens to be miserable. The commonwealth should abound with a store of all things, therefore nobody within it should go in want of the necessities of life. To ask a stranger for a garment is shameful, therefore it is criminal for a citizen to beg. So we must take precautions (if I may use the words of the Philosopher) lest the multitude be excessively needy. Indeed, we must devise a scheme that there be a daily supply of household stuff, so that gluttons and men like Dives may succor men like Lazarus, the infirm, the wretched. Why am I hesitating? The commonwealth ought to be self-sufficient, therefore nobody should go a-begging. The glory and honor of the commonwealth is that that nothing be wanting for life’s necessities, therefore no beggar should live within it. Beggary is rapacious, full of fraud and malice, therefore we must take precautions that nobody is compelled to go a-begging within the commonwealth. Finally, our ancestors all over the world had no beggars in their commonwealths, so it useful to imitate their wisdom and their example. “But what are you doing? Don’t you think the halt, the maimed, the orphans, the destitute who live in our jails and hospitals to be baggars?” No at all, if the commonwealth consults for them out of its abundance and income of goods. Good Christ, where is this concern for the unfortunate? Today there are many gluttons who set loose their hounds to rend Lazarus rather than giving bread to feed him. But listen, you wealthy man, nature bore you naked, ill fortune renders you naked. So why rail against paupers? Why look at mendicants with a frown? Xerxes filled Greece with his wealth and his arms, but went home scarce safe in a rowboat. You’re Croesus today? Tomorrow you’ll be Irus. You’re Caesar today? Tomorrow you’ll live sans kingdom. Therefore if you are wise you should cherish the needy, so if you take a fall from on high you won’t stick in the mud. For you see what station you are in now, but you don’t know, you heedless fellow, you don’t know, what unhappiness will oppress you. Honor is the esteem of men, as insubstantial as a shadow, which you should not trust overmuch. The pomp of this world is fleeting, covet it not too greedily. If succession has made you a noble, a rich man, a king, do not trample on any pauper, do not knock any pauper prostrate, since noble Pompey, wealthy Lucullus, king Dionysius have taken their falls.

THE DISTINCTION OF THE FIRST QUESTION
Is the commonwealth composed of middling citizens politically preferable to other forms of the republic?

5. OBJECTION The middling commonwealth is not directed according to virtue alone, therefore in this context it is not defined aright. The antecedent is clear, since the Philosopher’s entire disputation is about the mean between wealth and poverty, which is not virtue. The reasoning follows, since things are only called best because of virtue.
RESPONSE In this context virtue is understood as belonging more to the office than to the man. Since each and every man cannot pursue and exercise virtue with exactitude, Aristotle has devised the middling constitution, which he designates the best — best (as I have said) respectively, not absolutely.
OBJECTION The polity has a greater similarity and proportion with the human body than this middling republic of which the Philosopher speaks, therefore it is superior. The antecedent is proven, since in the polity there is a great dissimilarity of its parts, as in the human body. The reasoning hangs together, since in the text that commonwealth is called best which comes closest to nature.
RESPONSE There is no greater similarity and proportion with the human body in the polity, if you consider unity and consensus, which two things (as the Philosopher teaches) are most requisite in the commonwealth.
OBJECTION Virtue is a mean, as Aristotle teaches in the Ethics, but in this context it is posited as an extreme, therefore the question is ill-framed. The minor premise is proven, since citizens are called middling who are suspended between virtue and vice, honor and ignominy, liberty and servitude.
RESPONSE In this context, virtue is called an extreme with respect to its excellence and perfection, to which citizens rarely attain. Therefore, a possible mean, as they say, is assigned, which citizens can readily reach.
OBJECTION In the commonwealth, middling citizens cannot support the great expenses which they should., therefore the middling commonwealth is not the best.
RESPONSE It is not required that the citizens, but rather the commonwealth should publicly support these very great expenses, which can best be done in the middling commonwealth, in which peace is worshipped as a goddess.

THE DISTINCTION AND STATE OF THE SECOND QUESTION
Are the needy or beggars to be tolerated in the commonwealth?

 

I have printed no arguments here, since I shall speak more extensively about this subject elsewhere.

THE CHAPTER’S DOUBTFUL QUESTION
Do large commonwealth last longer than small ones?

6. Among the tokens by which Aristotle proves that the middling commonwealth is best, he expresses the opinion that large commonwealths last longer than small ones. But concord in the multitude is rare, similarity of morals and pursuits is rare. Hence the contrary appears to follow. But we must appreciate in what sense the Philosopher defends this opinion. For he does not teach that great and populous commonwealths are longer-lived simply, but with respect to that mediocrity of which he speaks in this context. For if an immense and populous commonwealth is composed and made up of middling citizens, such as seem neither to wax insolent out of abundance, nor to waste away with excessive poverty, every man will live content with his lot and not seek other men’s goods, and from this arises the great strength of civil friendship, in which the commonwealth lives, thrives, flourishes, and is preserved. Therefore to the degree that larger commonwealth are composed of middling citizens, to that extent they are less exposed to seditions, and for this reason are more stable and longer-lived, and this is Aristotle’s view.
OBJECTION Only the unity and harmony of virtue nourishes concord, therefore the contrary is ill-defended in this context.
RESPONSE Concord is understood in two ways, either ethically with respect to friendship, and thus it consists solely in virtue, or politically with respect to the peace of the citizens, and thus it is discerned in a certain equity of goods.
OBJECTION Great commonwealths are subject to more turns of fortune, according to that statement,, fortune rages less against small things, and the god strikes lighter things more gently. Therefore great commonwealths are not longer-lived. The antecedent is proven, since many citizens have diverse and dissimilar ways, and since they are frequently harmed by a greater hatred of their enemies.
RESPONSE This is true if the minds of the citizens are torn in different directions, which does not occur in middling constitutions, since each man has enough and people live in contentment. And since this is the case, they easily put down their enemy and cultivate long-lived peace in their commonwealth.

Chapter xii

Is every republic to be arranged with respect to the quality and quantity of its citizens?

OME of Aristotle’s interpreters speak rather diffidently here, apparently uncertain and doubtful what he means by quality and quantity. But the matter is without controversy if we compare what has gone before with his present teachings. For after he distinguished each and every form of the republic in terms of both kind and species, and also demonstrated that one which is popularly and communally the middling one, deemed (as they say) by supposition the best, it is now expedient that he show in greater deal what, what kind, and what size are suitable for each population. For just as it is the duty of the student of politics to set forth model republics that have, as it were, been tested against the Philosopher’s Stone, so our studies and thoughts might be borne to the difficult and fair things involved in making the civil sphere go round, so it is the task of the prudent man to describe the mediocre and easy forms of administration, which in his experience he has perceived to fit most appropriately the powers and customs of diverse men. For all men cannot look directly at the sun with the eagles, all men are not profoundly wise, mediocre things befit more men, and, if they attain these, they gain their life’s goal. Therefore in addition to those noble and excellent forms of the republic which are contained in virtue’s divine circumference, Aristotle requires others that are, as it were, subjects of popular perception, whose gates lie wider and whose access is more available to everybody. But, lest I be too verbose, Aristotle first gives us two axioms fit for every commonwealth, of which the first is this, that the part of the commonwealth which wishes the commonwealth to be safe must be stronger than the part which is discontented with the present state of affairs. The second is that there are two things to be considered regarding the parts of every commonwealth: quality, which consists of its liberty, resources, learning, virtue and honor, and quantity, which is comprised of its proportion of property and the number of its citizens. There is no difficult contention about his first proposition, for who will not more gladly give a hand to that part of the commonwealth which desires the republic to be safe than to that which rejoices in innovation in its condition? The way is safer, the reasoning better, the constitution is more happy which belongs to that commonwealth which stands under Jupiter than that which is subject to Mercury or the Moon (which stars have an unsteady and mutable influence). Therefore, if reason be more powerful than emotion, if virtue be stronger than the mind’s fickle intent, if mind be steadier than appetite, surely that part of the commonwealth in which thrive reason, virtue and intellect ought to be more effectual than that part in which emotion, the mind’s fickle intent and appetite hold sway. That part of the commonwealth which desires the republic to be safe possesses better reason, stronger virtue, a more wholesome mind, and therefore that part should prevail.
2. From Aristotle’s second proposition is taken the question now to be discussed, which is whether every republic is to be arranged with respect to the quality and quantity of its citizens. In this context, the Philosopher defines as quality the liberty, wealth, learning, splendor of birth or nobility, and defines quantity as the preeminence of its multitude. Circumlocutions aside, the people’s morals signify its quality, the number of citizens and proportion of property signify its quantity. Therefore the sense of the question is this, whether every republic is to be arranged according to the morals and number of its citizens. Aristotle maintains that it is to be arranged in this way. Yet he does not intend this, that the administration should flow in accordance with bad and dissolute morals, but that, a gentler way of administration being adopted, both the morals and the laws of the commonwealth might be drawn to the middling constitution of the republic (which here he lauds so greatly) gradually and step by step. But that the institution and preservation of every commonwealth should depend on these two things, namely quality and quantity, is proven by four arguments, of which the first works by a comparison, the second by a possibility, the third from disparate things, and the final one from a similarity or proportion. From a comparison, since when the quality and quantity of citizens are compared between each other, various kinds of republics exist: for example, where the needy prevail more in number than they are not bested by quality, there a popular republic arises. But, on the other hand, the power of the few appears there where the wealthy more greatly excel in quality (honor, say, or wealth) than they are bested by the number of the needy. The logic of the remaining administrations is similar. If, therefore, manifold constitutions and forms of the republic arises from the varied disposition of quality and quantity, it is needful that founders of commonwealths advisedly arrange every republic with respect to its quality and quantity. For although in the constitution of the commonwealth it is the duty of the statesman and the good man to bend and encourage citizens’ minds to the embrace of virtue, yet inasmuch as there is no gold without dross, no wheat without chaff, that is, when men very rarely live without infirmity, they must diligently consider the quality and morals of the place, and the quantity and multitude of men, lest the effort they have undertaken in passing laws be wasted and go for naught.
3. A second reason comes from a possibility, since, if the consideration of quality and quantity be neglected, it is impossible that the administration of the republic can be brought to the middling and best form. But, as the Philosopher teaches here, legislators must keep their eyes fixed on a middling proportion, lest the concord and harmony of citizens be transformed into extreme hatreds and discords of the rich and the poor, from which arise, as it were, a paralysis and convulsion of the limbs in the civil body, not without great damage. This very thing is confirmed by an argument from disparate things, since the contemplation of quality and quantity renders commonwealths happier, therefore its contempt leaves them wretched and ruinous. For let us suppose that some Cadmus intends to found a new Thebes, let us imagine that he wants to write laws according toh is whim, taking no account of liberty, wealth, virtue, breeding, morals, nor of the proportion of property or the multitude of his citizens. Do you not see that giants will arise from the sown teeth, who having been, as it were, made citizens overnight are drawn apart into factions to the destruction of themselves and their commonwealth? With this consideration neglected, Rome spattered its first foundations with fraternal blood; still pastoral, it bore leaves but no fruit. Yet when finally made a consular state it shadowed the entire globe with its branches, which surely happened when at length it took due account of quality and quantity. For, that I may conclude my contention with a comparison I have set forth, just as in the natural body a just proportion makes for beauty, so in the civil body a due consideration of both these things creates a singular unity, since, just as when those things are brought into a certain temperament by the force of nature, many limbs that are distinct in species are formed into a single body, so when these same things are brought to a certain harmony within the civil body, the various parts of the republic, distinct in their offices, are formed into a single commonwealth. If this be the middling republic, it is to be accounted (as it is in the text) the most excellent of all, since, as Aristotle says, if such a one is established an estrangement of its citizens is not to be feared. For the middling commonwealth is like a bridle, by which both rich and poor, both highest and lower are contained within duty’s circle. In the administration of the middling commonwealth, therefore, precaution is to be taken lest more than is proper be granted the well-to-do and men of high degree, since over the passage of time they will deceitfully strive to shatter and hamstring the strength of the people, engendering genuine evil out of false goods, that is, under the guise of good they will exercise all power and tyranny over the people. But I have written about this caution in this chapter’s doubtful question, now I come to the distinction.

THE DISTINCTION OF THE CHAPTER

 

4. OBJECTION In his enumeration of civil qualities Aristotle omits virtue, therefore he mishandled quality. The antecedent is clear from the Philosopher’s words, which are I call quality liberty, wealth, learning, and splendor of birth. The reasoning follows since among all the qualities of the commonwealth virtue is the most august.
RESPONSE Some commentators reply that virtue is tacitly understood, and for that reason is not absent. But others reply that in this context Aristotle is disputing about the middling commonwealth, which most mediates between rich and poor, noble and lowborn, wherefore he is speaking only of those qualities which pertain to its institution.
OBJECTION A consideration of quality does not allow for equality, therefore it is intolerable in the best commonwealth to be established. The antecedent is proven, since the consideration of quality brings about that freemen are preferred to slaves, the prosperous to the needy, the learned to the unlettered, the noble to the humble. The reasoning is clear, since in the middling commonwealth, said in this context to be the best, a certain equality between extremes is approved.
RESPONSE The remuneration of citizens in proportion to their merit argues no inequality. For civil equality exists then, when equity is observed and when every man is given his due.
OBJECTION Wealth and splendor of birth are gifts of fortune, therefore are not properly called qualities of the commonwealth. The reasoning holds, since on the basis of these things the commonwealth is not called thus-and-such per se.
RESPONSE The word “quality” is employed here as a blanket term for everything that does not belong to the essence of the commonwealth, but not strictly (as the dialecticians employ it) for only happenstance form, by which the subject is called thus-and-such simply and absolutely.
OBJECTION There can be no certain consideration of an infinite thing, the quantity of the commonwealth is infinite, therefore there can be no certain consideration of the quantity of the commonwealth. The minor premise is proven, since in the text the quantity of the commonwealth is defined as the predominance of the multitude.
RESPONSE The predominance of the multitude is understood in two ways, either indefinitely with respect to the great multitude of citizens and the proportion of property, as in this context, or infinitely as a huge number to be conceived only by the mind, and it is not understood in the text in this sense.

THE CHAPTER’S DOUBTFUL QUESTION
Is it dangerous to give more in the republic to the wealthy than to the multitude?

5. It’s an old saying, the man who is permitted more than what is reasonable craves more than what is permitted. One must be cautious in hunting with lions, for otherwise in the division of the prey nothing will be left for the little beasts. In every republic, the wealthy are for the most part like clawed lions, who (if I may use the Philosopher’s words) deceitfully shatter and hamstring the strength of the people, who over the passage of time engender genuine evil out of false goods, who out of their insatiable thirst for riches drink dry the flowing republic and wreck the administration of the commonwealth. Therefore we must heed Aristotle, who exhorts us to give no more than is reasonable to the well-to-do. For just as rivulets flowing into the sea make it to swell, thus abundant riches make the prosperous man haughty, and if you assign him more honor than is reasonable, you transform him from haughty to insane. Therefore we must beware lest many men like Crassus, that is, unreasonably rich and powerful men, live in the commonwealth, or at lest if they do live in it, that they do not grow swollen, heaped with many and great honors. The reasons are, since first they will corrupt the multitude, then will snatch at government, next will oppress the commonwealth, and finally will destroy everything, not otherwise than cruel tyrants. They will corrupt the multitude, for wonderful is the power of money, whose weight tires no hand, in the admiration of which no avaricious man is ever satisfied, although the people is yet more avaricious for its own interest, greatly admiring Plutus’ dung. Therefore, should the well-do-do become more powerful, they readily corrupt the multitude. They will snatch at government, for rich men have sharp claws, with which, vulture-like, they can rend the guts of the people. Therefore if you give the wealthy the incentives of honor, immediately they will make government their prey. They will oppress the commonwealth, for the oppression of the commonwealth is the daughter of Ambition. What, then, follows from all these things except that, armed with their wealth, they will cruelly devastate everything. Hence it is risky to give more in the republic to the rich than to the multitude, since this is to stir up tyranny rather than aristocracy, and a commotion and tempest of sedition.
OBJECTION This question was discussed in Book II, therefore it is superfluously treated here. The antecedent is proven, since there the Philosopher taught that we must beware lest anyone in the commonwealth accumulate riches according to his heart’s desire.
RESPONSE It is one thing not to acquire riches beyond reason, it is another for the multitude not to grant the well-to-do more than is reasonable. For the one forbids avarice as a disease, the other forbids ambition, which is followed by the destruction and downfall of the commonwealth.
OBJECTION In this very Book the Philosopher teaches that the prosperous are more fit for government than the multitude, therefore more is to be granted them. For honor is always attendant upon government, and is always rightfully due to those who govern.
RESPONSE The prosperous are considered in two ways, either simply, only insofar as their plenty of wealth and riches abounds, and thus they are not more fit for government; or compositely, insofar as, in addition to wealth and riches, they possess the endowments of the mind, and thus they are deemed more fit for government than the unrefined multitude.

Chapter xiii

In the polity is it permissible to deceive the people with sophistries?

S the Philosopher teaches here, there are five things with which nobles and the wealthy cleverly deceive the people within the polity, namely the public meeting, the magistrate, judgment, arms and military exercise. These are called the mysteries and secrets of the republic, in which is hidden a great power of right administration. For in the public meeting is the counsel of the commonwealth, in the magistrate its government, in judgment its oracle, and in arms and their exercise its strength and protection. If these be well regulated, long will the commonwealth flourish; if not, it is necessary that the commonwealth witness its tragedy of Hercules Furens, that is, the premature ruin of itself and its citizens, since if unfair councils, unjust governments, corrupt judiciaries and factious arms should rule, what commonwealth can remain standing? What shadow of the commonwealth remains? There is a sometimes a secret need for these five (being as they are indeed arcana) in the polity, that by their use the republic might not suffer loss or shipwreck. Stratagems and sophistries are deemed legitimate. For instance, if paupers who loathe the government of leading men should strive to knock the yoke of Caesar-like authority from off their necks, so that the commonwealth should not take abad turn for the worse, these great men can justly and sagely ensnare the haughty multitude, as if it were a careless little bird. If you ask about their snares and methods of deception, Aristotle is candid, distinctly relating the tricks and sophistries in these five things. For hence the silly Commons is readily induced to imagine itself safe, if it sees immunities conceded and granted to itself in precedence to the wealthy; if the wealthy are compelled by law to participate in counsels, magistracies, judgments, arms, and the protection of the commonwealth, whereas it be allowed those of more slender means to excuse themselves from all these. For there is a great color of severity with respect to the well-to-do and of liberty with respect to the others.
2. But if you weigh the matter more carefully, this severity is actually free, and the freedom conceded the people is severe. For under this show of freedom the nobles control government, and the people is coerced by its duty. Thus once no slight fine was established among the Spartans and the leading men were summoned to senate and assembly, but those of lesser fortunes were permitted to keep away, indeed were free to forswear magistracies, not undertake the duty of judging, purchase no arms, keep no vigils for the protection of the commonwealth. By these and similar sophistries a popular administration finally turned into an aristocracy and long endured under the rod and government of its best men. Here it must be carefully noted tha,, albeit in the text Aristotle ascribes these machinations and clever devices for passing laws only to oligarchies and democracies, their employment can come to light in every administration of the republic, but especially when the commonwealth has deviated from the right and cannot be turned back without some pretext of the good (pertaining to those in need of correction). Thus the oligarchical man sweetly addresses the people, and in passing his laws seems to favor it. But beneath his soft words he conceals pricklier secrets of the commonwealth, by which the deceived people is gradually and step by step drawn towards oligarchy, nor, in good citizen,s is this dissimulation, but rather a certain concealment of mysteries, to be used politically until; the wounds of the commonwealth are healed. For, as the skilled physician often cures grave diseases of the body with his gentle hand, so the prudent magistrate cures the more baneful faults of the republic with his subtle art.
3. That it is sometimes permissible to ply these sophistries and tricks for the good is proven by the examples of our ancestors, necessity, prudence, and the good of the commonwealth. By the example of our ancestors, for thus the Romans once transformed Tarquin’s tyranny into an aristocracy, thus the Athenians transformed a democratially constituted administration intoa government of the prosperous, the the Britons of old transformed barbaric anarchy into the most august majesty of kings. Necessity, too, often requires this selfsame thing, for when force cannot prove valid, art must prevail. It is perilous to employ force to recall the people from a bad custom, therefore one must perform the task by art. Just as stratagems can be justly and legitimately employed in war for a captain’s victory, so can sophistries in the republic for the tranquillity of the commonwealth, since prudence commands this, for in great matters skill demands cleverness, providence demands counsel. But, as I think, nobody is so improvident or imprudent as not to perceive that it is the mark of the improvident and imprudent statesman to reveal these secret remedies to the opposing party. Finally, who does not understand that this same thing is for the advantage and utility of the commonwealth, if evil has spread abroad in the civil community, so that by an ingenious pretext the slack sinews and dissolute morals of the republic may be happily mended, and the whole commonwealth, rotten, as it were, by the toxin of many crimes, may be reformed by the olive rather than the sword, the art of the prudent magistrate rather than an enemy hand? May that arch-sophist Machiavelli betake himself far away, who perverts Aristotle’s words and meaning. For these sophistries are not permitted for the nourishing of monstrosities of republics. Statesmen are not like mages who dazzle the awestricken mind of the multitude with their false characters, but are like philosophers, who do not disclose and reveal the mysteries of their art to any old man. Therefore if these secrets are brought to bear for the preservation of bad forms of the commonwealth, they should not be deemed and called stratagems, but rather furtive scehemes. Happy is the error of the people that leads it to the good, miserable is that which leads it to be bad! In the improvement of correct forms of the commonwealth these sophistries of wise magistrates draw the happily deceived people to the highest good, but in bad commonwealths they draw it to its destruction. Therefore, just as they should be praised in the former, so in the latter they should be repudiated and reprehended. But you will say that Aristotle takes his examples from oligarchy and democracy, which are certain deviations from the correct form of administration. Mark, however, that he only wishes this, that by these being considered and wisely employed to draw a logical conclusion, the middling republic might be engendered, which he has previously proved to be the best. For here he has these words: therefore it is clear, that if anyone wishes to mix these justly, things taken from both sides [the rich and the poor] must be combined in one.
4. Continuing next to the final thing in which the sophistries of the republic are concealed, namely to military exercise, Aristotle sets great store in warlike fortitude, and teaches that it is a difficult thing to decide whether the helm of the republic is to be conceded to armed men in accordance with the greatness of their estate. From the examples of the Malians and the ancient Greeks he shows that arms and martial strength are the sinews of the commonwealth, and their employment greatly conduces to the preservation of government, as long as the poor are not harried with insults nor deprived of their household property. For, should this happen, it is to be feared lest the snake lurk in the grass, that is, lest out of the cottages of the poor the flame of sedition burst forth and reach the citadels of the commonwealth, and consume them struck, as it were, with lightning. For the offended Commons is incited to whirlwind and storm.

THE DISTINCTION OF THE QUESTION

 

5. OBJECTION Evils are impermissible in the commonwealth, deceptions and sophistries are evil, therefore they are impermissible. The major premise is clear, since the union of citizens is the bond of justice. The minor is proven, since to deceive is to do one thing while feigning something else, which is nothing other than dissimulation.
RESPONSE Deceptions and sophistries are understood in this context as secrets of the republic, not as conspiracies, and these secrets are not evils when in their concealment the safety of the commonwealth is intended, not its destruction.
OBJECTION In the polity or mixed form of the republic, the people has a share in public assemblies, magistracy, judiciary, arms and military exercise, therefore it is unjust to swindle them in these thing under a pretext. The reasoning is clear, since thus there is danger lest it unwittingly incur the penalty of the law or the stain of perjury: the penalty of law, since, being deceived, it thinks about the law otherwise than the matter actually stands; the stain of perjury, because in every republic the citizens are bound by their faith to observe the laws.
RESPONSE The people is not swindled, for it is evil to swindle, but gradually and imperceptibly the commonwealth is led on to the good, which is not unjust. Furthermore, there is no fear of legal punishment or perjury before the people understands the interpretation and meaning of the law. For example, if there should be a law enacted that only noblemen must attend the senate under a penalty of £100, but that the people may live freely doing the work and business of the commonwealth, the multitude will perhaps imagine that this law has been enacted for its benefit, whereas (as the Philosopher teaches) its intention is that only the nobles should possess the government.
OBJECTION In the text, this clever artifice of passing laws is adapted to oligarchy and the power of the people by the Philosopher, therefore it appears to be permissible in bad administrations of the commonwealth. The antecedent is clear in the middle of this chapter, where Aristotle employs these very words.
RESPONSE First, some interpreters respond that, if respect is had for common human life, oligarchy and popular power are not simply bad forms of administration. But, in my opinion, a better answer is that Aristotle is teaching that these devices and clever artifices are only to be approved in either constitution to the extent that the middling form of government is created from a mixture of the two.
OBJECTION These sophistries are sometimes permissible so that the people will be drawn to the bad, therefore the contrary is wrongly defended. The antecedent is proven in the laws which maintain that usury and brothels are permissible, but under a show of virtue, lest rape or theft ensue.
RESPONSE In my opinion, laws are never so impiously established that they appear to give their approval to these two monstrosities. Therefore I reply that the license of human life is so great, our desire for pleasures and gain so unbridled, that the magistrates are compelled to tolerate these things, not to approve them.

THE CHAPTER’S DOUBTFUL QUESTION
Is everybody in the republic permitted to own arms?

6. The freedom to own arms is often turned to rage. Once the Scythians experienced this injury, whose armed slaves for a time possessed the government. Therefore those Persians were politic and wise who took away the Lydians’ bugles and gave them pipes, who took away their arms and gave them bacchanals and flutes, so that, rendered effeminate in this way, that people could be more firmly oppressed by the yoke of their government. It is perilous to concede arms to men in a rage, therefore arms are to be taken away from slaves. For, should they be armed, they are easily taught to hiss against their masters. This has been sufficiently demonstrated in Book II, where I dealt with the fact that slaves are not to be armed. Now the doubtful question is whether it should be permitted to any citizen in the polity to possess arms. These are the words if the Philosopher: a form of administering the republic should consist only of those men who have arms. Many commentators have concluded from these words that it should be permitted to anybody in the republic to possess arms, and certainly it is not without cause and reason that they draw this conclusion. For if any citizen at all is to be a participant in the commonwealth, any citizen at all ought to defend it; and if he ought to defend it, it will also be permissible for him to possess arms. Furthermore, inasmuch as no commonwealth is free of envy, inasmuch as no republic is without conspiracies, it is needful that the citizens have their arms handy, for otherwise the armed enemy will fall upon them, unarmed, and oppress them in their idleness before weaponry is fetched from the public armory of the commonwealth. Therefore, just as it is to be hoped that in any city there should be a store of arms, thus it will be safe if any man at all may possess warlike gear, protected by which he may quickly beat back the onslaught of the mortal foe. Indeed, delay invites danger in all affairs, but most of all in military matters and seditious upheavals. In this matter, we are not failed by the customs of our ancestors, who, by the edict of their laws, wished it to be ordained that each citizen keep arms at home. Thus decreed the Greeks, as it says in the text, thus the Persians, thus the warlike race of the Romans, thus now and in the past the Britons. Therefore the man who shuns this responsibility ought to be regarded among his citizens as more craven than callous. Then too, in many places the torches of envy are ablaze, frequently kindling minds to rage, whence, not otherwise than fierce lions and tigers, we are swept along to murder and bloodshed. If in this circumstance arms be wanting to sober men, there is nobody who does not see that a conflagration occurs. Finally, the greater the possession of arms, the safer the administration of the commonwealth. It is therefore permitted everybody to possess arms, nay, by rights he ought to possess them. But here I except from this law priests, academics, invalids, slaves and resident aliens: priests and academics, since their weapons are prayers and the arts; invalids, slaves and resident aliens, since in these men exists a source of fear, should they own them.
7. OBJECTION The possession of arms is often a cause of sedition, therefore is not to permitted to every citizen. The antecedent is proven, since, once hatred has been conceived, arms add great power.Many men conceive a hatred against the administrators of the republic, and if you give these men blades you will turn them from men less than sober into complete madmen.
RESPONSE The possession of arms is no cause of sedition, but rather an ill-affection of the will. Nor is the possession of arms to be abolished perpetually because bad men abuse them. This fire and water, those most necessary elements, would be abolished inasmuch as houses burned by fire and ships sunk in water are destroyed.
OBJECTION Experience teaches that it is safe to take arms away from that faction of citizens Hell-bent on evil, therefore the possession of arms is not to be permitted to everybody.
RESPONSE This reasoning does not hold, since it fallaciously proceeds from a secondary consideration to a simple one. For although under these or those circumstances it is permissible to take arms away from some men, yet it does not follow but that it is permissible for everybody to possess them when the republic is in a quiet condition. Here magistrates are to be advised that they exercise caution in taking away from certain men in times of sedition, for albeit men are thus rendered defenseless, yet their wills remain under arms, and they will strive by every means to accomplish by stealth what they cannot with steel.

Chapter xiv

Is the senate rightly defined and distinguished?

HE Philosopher has abundantly described what the best republic is absolutely, and of what and what kind of citizens it consists. Therefore now he adds a discussion of its powers and properties, which are located in its senate, magistracy, and judiciary. First he speaks generally about these three things, as they pertain to any commonwealth, then copiously and separately about how they are fitted to individual forms of administration. In these are concealed the secrets of the republic, as I have just said. In them shine the happy stars of the republic, as I shall now show. For from what source does the commonwealth gain more light than from its senate, in which it has counsel, than from its magistracy, in which it has government, than from its judiciary, in which it has an asylum of justice and equity? Therefore, just as a limbless human body is truncated and mutilated, so there is no commonwealth in which these three things are absent. If they are disposed by the order of prudence in the civil body as its three primary parts, they make the commonwealth august; if they are disposed badly, they make it monstrous. Rome once triumphed when her public assembly possessed the purple, her magistrates possessed the sword, her judiciary possessed the scales of equity. But Rome then fell when madness triumphed in the senate, fear in the magistracy, favor in judges. Therefore Aristotle concludes at the beginning of this chapter that the good writer of laws must diligently heed and consider these three, for if they are well disposed (as the Philosopher says) it is necessary that the form of administrating the republic will be well affected. For these are the pivots of the commonwealth, on which, as it were, the spheres ofthe republic perpetually revolve under beneficial or baleful starts, having their alterations and conversions.
2. Why say more? In this chapter the Philosopher first describes the senate, then relates its various methods, and lastly accommodates these individually to the various forms of administration. By a senate he means a council, a convened public meeting, the authority and providence of the entire commonwealth in its consultation. For the senate is a public and honorable convocation of the commonwealth in which consultations are held about peace and war, death and life, treaties and truces, the laws, exile, proscription of property, the magistrates’ submission of accounts, and, in sum, all matters of great weight and moment. Public, since it is held in some public place, such as the courtrooms, temples, and consecrated places at Rome. Honorable, since in it the greatest account is made of dignity. In this context, by peace I understand the tranquillity of the commonwealth, by war the furious tragedy enacted by the enemy, by life its preservation, by death a man’s civil condemnation, by treaties and truces the bonds of faith, by laws the sinews of the republic, by exile the punishment of a citizen undeserving of his nation, by proscription of property the legitimate auction of goods, by the magistrates’ submission of accounts a justly demanded and rendered audit of their office and dignity. Happy indeed is the commonwealth in which lives a wise senate, in which senators and counselors justly and prudently take consideration about so many and so great matters. If men of the gown consult, the palm will flourish, but if only armed men do so, it is to be feared lest the laurel of peace lose its color. Would that in every senate the men of the gown and the armed men would join hands, that the powers of the mind would fight along with the brawn of Hercules! Ulysses was friend to Achilles, Aeneas to Hector. Why should armed Pallas be banned from consular colleges?
3. But Aristotle continues, showing the diverse methods of consulting or holding the senate. He says the authority of consulting is allowed either to everybody, to one, or to some: to everybody, as in a popular constitution and democracy, to one as in kingship and tyranny, to some as in the power of the best men and oligarchy, to which he adds the mixed scheme of deliberation employed in the polity. The first kind he again distinguishes into four methods, of which the first is when all men have the right and equality to consult about all things, yet not everybody all at once, but rather that men chosen by lot or election out of the various tribes and parts of the commonwealth should come to the senate, as happens (he says) in the form of administering the republic instituted by Telecles of Miletus and in many other cities in which this order of public meeting and senate is observed. The second method of holding the senate in a democracy is when each and every man is convened and assembled together and dispute about the creation of magistrates, the passage of laws, war, peace, and submission of accounts, but relegaet other things to be explained to magistrates either elected by all or chosen by lot. The third method mentioned in the text is very similar to this one, but differs from it in that in the second method magistrates have only the authority to explain, but in this one they also have the power to decide. To which can also be added this differentiating characteristic, that in the second method magistrates are created by either lot or election, but in this one only by the ballots and votes of the people. The final method is is when all men assemble and deliberate about all things, and the magistrates take precedence before other men only in this, that they speak first in proposing their ideas, count votes, pronounce sentences, yet they do not dare decide or define anything without the people. Which manner of consultation pertains to the last and worst species of popular administration, as I have shown above, and in many things is the equivalent of tyranny.
4. Now that this distinction about consultation under a democratic constitution of the commonwealth has been given, another kind follows, in which the authority of consultation is conceded to some men but not everybody, and in oligarchy this has three models and methods. The first is when magistrates, chosen because of their middling estate, consult about matters of great moment in a civil senate, instructed by the will and government of the laws, and this method pertains not so much to oligarchy as to the polity and the mixed constitution of the republic. The second is when the wealthy have not so much the power of deliberation as of decision. The third is when the wealthy elect themselves to magistracies so their sons might succeed them, and subject the laws to themselves, not themselves to the laws, as is demanded by equity and justice. But (as the Philosopher teaches here), if magistrates be created from the better men of the commonwealth, if the right of consulting and defining about war, peace, and the other great affairs of the republic be granted them, this is either an aristocracy (which is most to be hoped for) or a political constitution, which appears the form most to be approved when virtue fails . But their difference lies in this, that in an aristocratic senate election depends on the votes of the best men, but in the political constitution it sometimes depends on lot, whence arises the doubtful question to be discussed by me at the end of this chapter.
5. The third thing treated in this chapter is the accommodation of all these methods to the use of certain republics, in which appear to lurk the sophistries and secrets of the commonwealth I have mentioned above. The first is that a penalty is levied on the wealthy if they do not come to the senate, to the judiciary, to the magistracy when bidden. But a reward for their appearance is appointed for the poor. Another is that men be chosen out of all the parts and members of the commonwealth, by either lot or vote, who should undertake the duty of consultation. For they will consult better (as he says) if everybody consults together: the multitude with distinguished and noble men, and them with the multitude. The last one is that this reward be taken from the multitude if it greatly outnumbers the distinguished and noble men, and that it only be given those who surpass other men of the multitude in intelligence, counsel and virtue. It is also useful in an oligarchy that the Commons should not lack magistracy, but that it be admitted to the benches of political dignity under the condition that there is a legislative chamber in which preliminary councilors or guardians of the law precede the people in holding a previous deliberation. Thus the people will be a partner and shareholder in counsel and its decisions will be difficult to repeal, especially when only those things are handled in the senate which others who have deliberated about them previously wisely place before it. Why say more? In every republic much is to be conceded the people, either genuinely or in appearance. Yet this lion is to be pacified with care and prudence lest it be held on too slack a rein and become insolent, or it be held on to tight a one and it become savage. Hence (as Aristotle says) the Greeks desired their people to have authority for the passage of a law, but no authority for its repeal. But I shall say more about these matters in Book V, where the dispute will be about the preservation and overthrow of the republic.

THE DISTINCTION OF THE QUESTION

 

6. OBJECTION The word “senate” does not stand in Aristotle’s text, therefore its definition is wrongly printed here, as if he had given it.
RESPONSE This reasoning does not hang together, for if the the word “senate” is not in the text, nevertheless the thing itself is, which he variously calls the public assembly, the consultative part of the commonwealth, the council itself, and the convention of assembled citizenry.
OBJECTION The senate can be defined more briefly, therefore it is poorly defined here. The argument holds, since that is done vainly in many words which can be done with fewer. The antecedent is proven, since it can be defined as the supreme legislative body of the republic, which has the power of consultation and definition regarding matters of common interest.
RESPONSE Although a long-winded definition is faulty, as it is said in the precepts of dialects, yet if for interpretation’s sake true things are stated, they are not to be rejected.
OBJECTION In defining the senate not only the material, which consists of matters of great weight, but also the form, which consists of the dignity of senators and of order, is to be considered; there is no consideration of senators and the order of consultation in this definition, therefore it is badly defined. The major premise is clear, since every definition consists of material and form. The minor is proven, since here mention is only made of the subjects which occur in civil consultation.
RESPONSE In this definition consideration of persons and order is made implicitly (as they say) rather than explicitly. I say implicitly, since public consultation cannot be had without the order of the men doing the consultation, who have various classes according to their dignity and honor, as was observed in the Areopagus, the Roman Senate, and other public councils all over the world, now and in the past.
OBJECTIONThe most important thing to be handled in the senate is the election or creation of the magistrate, no mention of this is made in the definition, therefore this definition is too short and incomplete. To this can be added that no account is made of the time at which the council meets.
RESPONSE That which is of necessity understood (as they say) is not lacking. It is understood the election of the magistrate is a most necessary thing, since he is the mind of the commonwealth. Furthermore, in the exposition of his definition the Philosopher often speaks of the creation of magistrates by lot or vote. What you add about account being taken of time, I reply that this is to be left entirely to the prudence of the commonwealth, that the senate only be convened when the occasions of the republic and the most important affairs of the commonwealth demand it.
OBJECTION In assigning the various methods of deliberation no form of a senate is ascribed to monarchy, and none to tyranny, therefore Aristotle does not handle all the methods fully and accurately. The antecedent is clear in the text. The reasoning is proven, since in monarchy (which is the best constitution of the republic) the best methods should be assigned, and in tyranny (which is the worst) the most cautious.
RESPONSE He omits tyranny since that is not a form of the republic. And he comprehends monarchy under aristocracy, whose manner of senate he describes in this context when he enjoins that magistrates should be elected from the better sort of men in the commonwealth, that in the senate the multitude should ponder about great matters with the leading men, and other things that are clearly obvious in the text.

Chapter xv

Is the magistrate rightly defined?
Is the election of the magistrate by lot to be approved in the republic?

ESIDES the senate (about which I have now spoken) a second light of the republic is the magistrate, whose influence and preservation the commonwealth seeks. Opportunely, he is dealt with next. I shall say nothing here about the necessity of the civil magistrate, nothing about his honor and dignity. Yet I cannot keep my silence about this one thing, that the magistrate is nothing else in the republic than the intelligence in the mind, the soul in the body, the helmsman in the ship, the sun in the sky. For from the magistrate the commonwealth has its intellect, its life, its anchor of security, the light of its honor. In this treatment of magistrates, particular consideration is given to their nature, species, number, quality, material, time, and establishment, all of which are introduced at the very outset of this chapter (where Aristotle explains the order of proceeding upon which he has decided). But before Aristotle comes to his definition of the magistrate, he first shows what men do not deserve the title of magistrate. Among these are numbered priests who handle holy things, choirmasters who preside at holidays, heralds who announce oracles, and legates who conduct public business abroad. Next the concern in which the power of the magistrate mostly consists is distinguished in a few words: that it is a care either for all things, such as the command of an army; or of a part, such as a care for women and the morals of the young, or of the marketplace (such as dealing with measures, weights and numbers of things put up for sale); or of a ministerial kind, since certain offices require some servants, such as those who open and shut city gates, repair public buildings, prepare arms for war, and the like. All these offices, I say, have a title, but they do not participate in the magistrate’s power and nature simply and absolutely, as the definition of the magistrate (which now follows in the text) accurately shows. Therefore the magistrate is a public person elected by succession, lot, or vote, who has a right and power in consultation, judgment, and government. He is defined as a public person, for a private person is not called a magistrate. He is selected by succession, as in monarchy, by lot, as frequently occurs under a public constitution and oligarchy, or vote, as in the power of the best men or aristocracy, in which very little is entrusted to fortune and accident. He is elected, that is, approved by the consent of the commonwealth, and he has the right (in accordance with law) and power (in accordance with his office) of consulting about future things, judging about past things, and governing his fellow citizens.
2. It appears to me that this definition comprehends three things: the grandeur of the magistrate, since he is called a public person; the order of the commonwealth, since he is called elected; and the use of his office, since from him are sought oracular responses of consultation, judging and governing. But the Philosopher says that the particularly proper work and duty of the magistrate is to govern, whereas the other two are sometimes common to him and others, since all citizens are defined as participants in consultation and in judgment. But in actuality the right of governing pertains exclusively to the magistrate. Thus, just as magistrates are the most august persons and, as it were, the lights of the commonwealth, so of all the things done in the commonwealth governing is the most grand and august. For, just as in government there exist two souls, reason (whose function is to consult about what is to be done) and will (which is to instruct and command), so there are two elements in civil administration, the senate (in which is exercised consultation, which is a great thing) and the the magistrate (in whom is government, the most august thing of all). For the senate dictates and inquires what things are to be done and what are to be left undone, but the magistrate and the prince order these dictates and inquiries to be observed. Wherefore, just as an act of will is nobler than an act of intellect, so government, the action of the magistrate, is far more illustrious than consultation, which pertains to the senate. Therefore commandment most greatly touches upon the nature of the magistrate, and this is called the proper and germane form of the magistrate. But although commanding and giving instructions argues greater authority and virtue than consulting, nevertheless, just as will is blind in the absence of intellect (by whose beams it is enlightened), thus the prince is said to be blind in the absence of counsel. For just as will is not brought to fruition save concerning a thing that is understood, so the magistrate ought to give no instruction not previously discussed in council, since, just as will frequently errs in acting contrary to the dictate of reason, so the magistrate who does not heed advice may often be said to act and command unjustly. For this reason, even if the definition and nature of the magistrate may be most evident in ordering and commanding, nevertheless he ought to submit and restrain himself so that he not hold in contempt the voice of senate and council.
3. So much about the nature of the magistrate. His species, number and quality follow. There is a distinction in his species, a fewness and manyness in his number, and a perfection in his quality. Therefore magistrates are distinguished into the mind and the hand, into the supreme and the middling, into the savior and the warden of the commonwealth. Appetite, sensation, and all parts of life are referred to the mind, seated in the citadel of reason, and thus each and every part of the republic are referred to the ruler. For the supreme magistrate is the single governor, very powerful, just, into whose right hand is placed the golden scepter, into whose left is placed the scales of equity. Single, since the poet says, Indeed, all of us Achaeans should not rule, nor is it a good thing for many to reign. Let their be one king, the government of a single man to whom great Jupiter has given a golden scepter, and has commanded to give law to his subjects. Very powerful, so that he may prescribe for other;, just, so that he may outshine others by the example of his life, he to whom the scepter is given in token of his honor, and the scales in token of his justice and equity. But in this context are treated the number, forms and quality of middling magistrates, which things Aristotle comprehends in the text with a few words. A definite number cannot be defined save with respect to the large commonwealth and the small. For in the large commonwealth, as he says, there must be many magistrates, and few inthea small: many in the large, both because of the multitude of citizens who can be taught to perform a magistracy, and because of the great number of things which cannot be handled conveniently save by many men; few in the small, both because of the scarcity of men who can mange the republic wisely, and because of the small advantage which they can hope for from this. Hence it happens that in small commonwealths the same men may simultaneously possess several magistracies. For, just a single candelabra holds several lights, so in the small commonwealth a single citizen can hold several dignities of office. If I may use the Philosopher’s words, There is no obstacle to entrusting many concerns to a single man at the same time.
4. Why say more? When this definition of the small and the large commonwealth has been made, a prudent man may easily adjudge how many there should be in any given commonwealth. Likewise, it will no difficult thing to delineate their species and qualities. For, since middling magistrates are regarded, as it were, as the hands, instruments and primary parts of supreme magistrates, who is there possessed of even moderate experience in political affairs who cannot readily distinguish the offices of magistrates into their species? For example, when he perceives that care must be had for morals, who will not think the censor necessary? When he sees that another care must be had for goods on sale, who will not understand the need for the aedile and prefect of the grain supply? When he understands there is another care to be had for war, who will not appreciate the need for the general? And, seeing that care must be had for court-cases, who will not think the judge and the praetor necessary? When these things are understood, conjecture about their qualities will not be arduous and difficult, for the virtues of each of these need to be such as are requisite for the offices they perform within the commonwealth. In the text there is littlesaid about the material with which the magistrate is concerned. Yet it is always so that they are confronted with the things over which they preside. For if they are supreme, this is the republic; but if they are middling, the things befitting their office take the place of material, such as the grain supply for the office of aedile, morals for that of the censor, weapons and related things for the prefect of war. It is hard to offer any certain definition about the duration of a magistracy, wherefore the consideration of this thing will be left to the prudent, with due account taken of places, times and things. But the Philosopher makes the distinction that some, such as kings, exist in perpetuity, but others are for a defined time, and these either for a year (like the Roman consuls) or for six months or less, like dictators, who only presided during the stormy seasons of the republic.
5. The last portion of this chapter is devoted to the establishment of magistrates. Regarding establishment, three things should be considered: who does the establishing, out of whom they are established, and the method of establishment. Hence it is asked whether magistrates should be elected and created out of all citizens or only out of some of them. Again, whether those who are to perform the duties of the commonwealth should be chosen and selected by all citizens indiscriminately, or whether (as among the Megarans) by some. Finally, whether civil magistrates are to be created by lot or vote. The first uncertainty is about those doing the establishment, the second about those who are established, the third about the method and rationale of establishing. From the particulars of these things Aristotle drew other logical conclusions and sagely accommodated them to individual forms of administrating the republic. For example, to make all men magistrates, chosen by everybody, by lot or election, pertains to popular power, in which the multitude ardently and industriously aims at the equality of all men in all things. But when magistrates are in part created out of all the citizens, in part out of some of them, this is pertinent to the polity and the mixed constitution of the republic, for this administration is composed of the power of the people and of the few, as I have said above. Finally, if magistrates are elected out of some citizens, and these are good men, the power of the best emerges, and so forth about the other forms, which are all clearer than daylight in the text.
6. And so, aiming at brevity, I come to the question whether the election of magistrates in the republic by lot is to be approved. The word “lot” is understood in various ways, for sometimes it denotes the outcome of consultation, often the dice-roll of fortune, and occasionally prophecy and art of divination. For these three things raise an anxious and doubtful concern, frequently driving the human mind into a whirl and labyrinth of contradiction. I think the first kind permissible, but believe the other two are to be avoided. And since the last form of lot has crept into the bowels of many a republic by black divination (as I fear), and spread its poison in their body not without suspicion of future plague, I say that Saul may not conjure up shades from Hell to learn his successor in government. I say that it is a horrible thing to consult the oracles of devils so we may gain a kingdom with the assistance of their black birds. This is a monstrous means of gaining a scepter, a superstitious way of possessing government. Therefore let Bacons be banished from every well-regulated republic, let sorcerers be banished, let their circles be destroyed, their candles snuffed, their lights burned out. Oh would that their names be obliterated! For of a surety, if I am not mistaken (and indeed in I would cheerfully be mistaken), when these sciences are introduced into the commonwealth, a great loss of faith ensues. Light cannot coexists with darkness, truth with lies, faith with fraud, religion with magic, Christ with Belial, the City of God with oracles of devils. If you wish me to prove this, read sacred philosophy and you will see it is forbidden; read human, you will find it denied; read the counsels of our ancestors and them you will find this kind of lottery wholly expunged and abolished with dire curses. Turn the pages of the annals of antiquity, ponder the colleges of augurs, haurspexes, flamens, and soothsayers, put before your eyes the corpses of kings and republics who placed their trust in these, and if you strive to do the same, then fear, for, trust me, the kingdom gained by such a lot is unsteady and quickly falls. Act so that the lines of political administration be led straight from center to circumference, strive that the future fate of the republic be foretold by the consultation of the wise, not the divination of wizards. For the former is a just way of soothsaying, the latter is iniquitous. Yet here I am not denying that there is a certain permissible divination in the commonwealth, such as the prediction of famine, war, death, heaven’s course and motion, which being understood beforehand by art often render us more careful. In this context I only tax those who, being over-wise, do not dread and venerate the wisdom of Him Who rules the stars.
7. Another kind of lot lies in fortune’s cast, concerning which the question now is, whether election of magistrate by lot is to be approved. The Philosopher appears to allow this form of electing magistrates in democracy and in oligarchy, since within these constitutions the torches of sedition would blaze in the absence of the lot. For in the popular constitution the equality of all, and in oligarchy the freedom of the rich are easily schooled to faction, if some secret scheme does not calm ambition’s surge, and there is no safer scheme than election by lot. But here I am concerned with the correct forms of republic, in which such election should not be approved, which I succinctly prove by these arguments. The election of the magistrate is the greatest of all the things in the commonwealth, and are like the key to the republic, and therefore should not be entrusted to fortune’s whim. The antecedent is agreed, since the magistrate is the commonwealth’s Atlas, upon whom depends the universal condition of the republic. The reasoning follows, since to entrust such a great thing to fortune would be like losing the commonwealth at a cast of the dice. Furthermore, every magistrate ought to be prudent and just, but such a man is not gained by lot, therefore election should not occur by lot. Next, in the election of the magistrate we should not have regard for the person as much as for the community, the community bids us elect and create magistrates by vote rather than lot, therefore lots are not approved in election. Also, those things are only to be committed to lot which cannot be achieved and understood by reason, the election of magistrates can be achieved and understood by reason, therefore the election of magistrates should not occur by lot. Then too, if election should occur by lot, Man would not be at all surpass the beast, which is governed only by nature and chance, Man surpasses the beast in reason and prudence, therefore he ought to rule the commonwealth by reason rather than chance, prudence rather than fortune. Finally, the lot falls more often to fools than to the prudent, according to that saying, fortune favors fools, therefore it is risky to elect a magistrate by lot. I therefore conclude that counsel is most requisite in the election of magistrates, for accident in their creation often engenders great danger, blind lot begets wretched shipwreck.

THE DISTINCTION OF THE QUESTION

 

8. OBJECTION There are magistrates in the popular constitution of the republic, but under that constitution they do not possess the power of governing, therefore the magistrate is wrongly defined in terms of his power to govern. The minor premise is agreed, since an equality of all men exists in that constitution, as proven above.
RESPONSE In the popular constitution, equality exists with respect to liberty, not dignity. For although equality is requisite in that constitution, it is not meant that laws and magistrates should not rule, by that no man in the whole multitude should be deprived of the hope and expectation of obtaining a magistracy, for in democracy every individual can have a share of dignity.
OBJECTION If governing is the form of the magistrate, then he who governs the most is most a magistrate; a military commander governs the most, and therefore a military commander is the greatest magistrate. But in the text the military commander is excluded from the title and account of the magistrate.
RESPONSE Properly speaking, government is only that possessed by law rather than the sword, equity rather than force. Since, therefore, Mars is mortality and war, as it were, is the scourge of the commonwealth, the constitution or form of the commonwealth does not reside therein. For then necessity becomes a virtue, and the dictator ruling temporarily is called a magistrate by analogy, yet not truly, since in time of war the laws (the sinews of the commonwealth) do not speak.

OBJECTIONS TO THE SECOND QUESTION

9. OBJECTION It sometimes happens that equally worthy men canvass to obtain the government, in this case an election by lot is deemed the best, therefore election by lot should sometimes be approved. The minor premise is agreed, since in the casting of lots there is no hint of ambition, no fear of sedition.
RESPONSE I do not deny all use of the lot in the election of the magistrate or the judgment of the constitution, but if the things being handled can be defined or understood by reason, I think it quite silly to entrust to chance that which can be circumscribed by the sure reasonings of the law. Therefore I respond to this argument, if equally worthy men canvass to obtain a magistracy, and the commonwealth has cause to fear their talons if they are refused the magistracy by vote, it is safer to elect them by lot than by vote. But if the equally worthy men who canvass to obtain the government are good men too, or if the people has no fear of those who are rejected, the honorable custom of voting is not to be abrogated.
OBJECTION Election by lot in democracy and oligarchy are approved here by Aristotle, therefore they are not to be denied in any constitution of the republic. The antecedent is proven by reason, since under popular rule equality of liberty, and under oligarchy equality of estate and wealth, will become seditious when rejected by vote, but will remain sedate when rejected by lot.
RESPONSE I have taught that lots are not to be admitted in correct forms of the republic, so we have no dispute about this issue, for these constitutions are perversions and faults of the commonwealth. Yet in them the lot is permissible because of their equality of liberty, estate, or the equality of the men standing for election. For there seems no safer way of electing them than by lot, so sedition will not arise. But if it can conveniently be accomplished otherwise, far better for it to be accomplished by vote than by lot, for in the former truth often exists, in the latter happenstance always does.
OBJECTION Scripture approves of election by lot, therefore it is legitimate. The antecedent is clear in the election of Matthias to company of the Apostles.
RESPONSE A single election does not have the force of law, nor was that lot (as they say) merely fortuitous, but was destined by the Holy Ghost for its chosen vessel.

THE CHAPTER’S DOUBTFUL QUESTION
Should priests perform a civil magistracy in the republic?

10. In the text, the Philosopher very explicitly excludes priests from civil magistracies, for (says he) we must decide that this class of men (he means priests) is something different from civil magistrates. Sagely said, Aristotle. For what else is a priest than a man offering sacrifices to God, who, if he became wrapped up in concerns about civil matters, loses the light of his divinity? His divinity, I say, since the virtue of this office is holiness, in which piety itself consists. These are often bad men, but the virtue of their office remains. The reason is that the virtue of their office depends on God, not Man. Yet I do not deny that, just as cackhanded physicians often destroy human bodies, so bad priests occasionally murder mortal souls: the former by the poison of their medicine, the latter by the example of their wicked life. But, to set forth this axiom of the Philosopher a little more exactly, it is not expedient for priests to perform a civil magistracy in the republic. The reasons by which I prove this are taken from the definition of their office, from the nature of their life, from the material with which they are concerned, from their time, from their end. The office of priests is to reconcile mortals to God by divine means, which work demands a man free and immune from all civil concern. For what earthbound man can contemplate heaven? Civil administration has great weight, but to fly perpetually in the sky (the priest’s duty) needs wings swifter than the eagles’. What shall I dispute about the nature of their life? Since there both many priests and few, many in name but few in truth, the priest’s life ought to be contemplative, not political. For if he is to intermediate between God and Man, what kind of intermediate is he if he undertakes a civil duty? Action and speculation have a certain inconsistency, albeit no contradiction, yet they thus harmonize that they are unable to coexist within a single man. Therefore, if the life of the priest consists solely in the contemplation of the spirit, I venture to conclude that very rarely should he undertake a duty of the commonwealth. The material which God’s ministers handle is religion, which tends towards God. But this has no seat in the civil theater, he does not deal with profane and secular matters, by his power he establishes no laws. Therefore it does not behoove the priest to perform civil magistracies. For what distracts the mind from religion more than the scepter’s gold? What hinders the man at prayer more than contemplation of this world? Also, the very time of the priest’s creation proves this. For Aristotle wanted the priest to be consecrated only at that age of life when, in accordance with nature, his hoary locks grant his ancient gravity leisure and liberty from all civic business. For then the chaos and muttering of the emotions ceas;, assuredly then, if ever, do are the light and tinder of reason and piety aglow. Finally, the end of this divine duty is to shun the toys and shadows of the commonwealth, to scorn the hubbub of the people and the multitude, to teach the ignorant, always to pray, and to consecrate themselves and others to God. Is this to canvass for the duties of the commonwealth? To hunt after dignities and civil honors? To live amidst delights? To wield weapons? To bob on the waves of business? Rightly, Chrysostom, you said the duty of the priest is to warn the people, not to wield arms. The reason, I believe, is that he grasps the sword of the mind, not of Mars. If, therefore, the priest has regard for his end, he should not become troublously involved in civil and perishable matters, unless, like Prester John, he wants to wear his gown in the morning, and armor in the evening.
11. But at this point it must be appreciated that this and similar axioms of political administration, not otherwise than laws, are altered according to the circumstances of times and places, and are capable of being wholly denied. If, therefore, there be men like Scaevola among the priesthood, I do not deny but that they should seat on the honorable benches of the commonwealth. If they be like Daniel, I do not deny but that they should sit as members of the king’s council and govern provinces. If they be like Epiphanius, I do not deny but that they be magnificent ambassadors on civil business. If they be like Macchabee, I do not deny but that under arms they should strike down God’s deadly enemies. I am aware that God granted a kind of civil sword to Moses, to Samuel, Esdra, the Macchabees, and other priests of olden times. I am likewise aware that almost everywhere in the world they are summoned to the sides of princes, to courtrooms, to councils, to the business, duties and offices of the commonwealth, and that they are not unjustly endowed with honors. Yet I think that this only occurs by special (as they say) privilege, and that this is only conferred upon them so that consecrated persons, sitting with others in the theaters of the republic, might most watchfully mark and observe lest the human city ever deviate from the City of God, the political sword from the sword of the Word, that is, lest men’s counsels, laws, morals and edicts ever deviate from divine oracles. Therefore when I am now teaching here out of the Philosopher that civil magistracies ought not be conceded to priests, I am indeed speaking generally, not specifically: generally that a distinction should be made between the priesthood and government, not specifically that, in accordance with national custom some addition of external authority not be added to the internal virtue of priests, by which the unlettered and unschooled multitude is often more swayed than by religion. Therefore let Melchisidech be a king and a priest, but in the figure of Christ; let Eli be a priest and a judge of the people. Let priests sometimes be endowed with political garments and duties. Yet I urge that they grasp these things with their left hand, not their right, and regard them as given as a privilege, not as things simply due them because of their office.
12. OBJECTION It has previously been conceded that priests are parts of the commonwealth, therefore it is to be conceded that they can become participants in magistracies. The argument holds, since the parts of the commonwealth are citizens, and citizens have a share of counsel, judgment, and magistracy, as Aristotle has previously defined them.
RESPONSE Inasmuch as no administration of the republic is so barbaric as to approve no religion, priests (who are in the service of religion) are called parts, yet are separate from secular affairs so that, living more piously, they may outshine the others. Therefore I deny that all the parts of the commonwealth have a share in magistracy, nor did Aristotle mean this in defining the citizen, unless by analogy, as you may see there.
OBJECTION Magistracies are most due to the best men, priests should be the best men, therefore magistracies are most due to priests. The major premise is Aristotle’s, where he teaches that a man’s virtue is requisite in a magistracy. The minor is agreed, since priests are ministers of God.
RESPONSE In the election of the magistrate Aristotle seeks ethical virtues, not contemplative ones: the former indeed render a man good, whereas the latter make him pious; the former are such virtues as fortitude and prudence, but these are ones such as religion and the contemplation of God, in which shine the office of the priest, and the latter are distinct and separate from the former. Therefore priests are to be kept separate from magistrates.
OBJECTION There are certain issues in the commonwealth which cannot be decided without the advice of the priest, such as issues and cases of conscience. It is therefore permissible for a priest to undertake a magistracy, that he may handle these issues.
RESPONSE I concede that the priest sits in the court of conscience and decides cases according to the oracle of the Word, yet I do not concede that the priest should strike the guilty with his sword, but rather that he should commit those stricken by the Word to the sword of civil magistracy.
OBJECTION In many nations, priests hold the highest offices of the commonwealth, therefore usage appears to approve the very thing you reject.
RESPONSE I admit that priests are sometimes admitted to the highest offices in the commonwealth for very pressing reasons. Yet this usage does not make a law. For, though I confess this to be just, the interpreters do not think this can be claimed according to the essence of their office. It is just, since they often perform their offices prudently. It is not according to the essence of their office, since they have undertaken another duty, distinct from the secular one, upon which they should busy themselves and meditate day and night. The reason is that this duty demands the whole man, not a part of him.

Chapter xvi

Should judicial hearing be given to trifling disputes between citizens?

HE climax and, as it were, the final period both of this Book and of the commonwealth is judgment, about which argumentation occurs at this place. I call it the climax and period because the pivot of the commonwealth revolves around judgment, and within it is set the whole power, perfection and administration of justice. For what else is judgment than, as it were, the scales of equity, the voice of the law, the conclusion of all contention and strife? And if you should wish it to be defined more briefly, it is the express conclusion of justice itself regarding all things brought to law. Speaking of it now, the Philosopher, as it were, constructed a single syllogism, whose major premise sets forth its order, whose minor sets forth its material, and whose conclusion sets for the use of judge and judgment. Its order is evident in these words, It remains (he says) for me to speak of that which presides over the judging of things. Here he also demonstrates that in judgments three things are to be considered: by whom it is done (which looks to the person), about what things (which looks to the material), and by what method (which looks to the means of electing and creating the judge). This preface about the order now having been given, there follows an assumption about the material of the judge, which is manifold and numerous, for it has eight parts. Judgment is instituted, first, for the demanding of accounts from magistrates, so that the greatest men in the administration might understand that they are subject to the court and should comply with it. Hence, surely, there will derive a great religion in the performance of magistracies, if, just as the judge pronouncing sentence should bear in mind that God is his witness, so the magistrate should remember that he has a severe judge in the commonwealth. The second thing judgment is concerned about is injury inflicted on public persons, such as insults, contempt of their authority and the like, and the men responsible for these things should be punished very severely, lest, the stars of the commonwealth put out, storms of sedition arise. The third thing in which judgment is brought to bear is crime against the state of the republic and the community, such as treason and Catiline-like conspiracy, which crimes should be cut off quickly with the sword of a Cato, lest Lentulus and Cethegus (lest men of the more powerful sort, that is) desert to the enemy camp under dark of night. The fourth is about losses and penalties to be inflicted both on magistrates and private citizens, whence it comes about that each and every men, bound, as it were, by the chains of the same law, fears to offend and transgress. The fifth is about private contracts concerning important matters, in the resolution of which resides a great tranquillity of the commonwealth. The sixth is about manslaughter, which is either voluntary or involuntary, or which can be lawfully defended. The Philosopher lingers a little in demonstrating this material, and shows that among attorneys there are three means of disputing a case of homicide, for if the defendant denies that he committed manslaughter, it is asked whether he did one, whence it is a conjectural inquiry; if he should admit the deed, it is asked whether he did so wittingly or unwittingly, willingly or unwillingly, justly or wrongly, whence it is a judicial inquiry; or if it is doubted whether a manslaughter took place, it is asked what the accused did, whence arises (as they say) a definitive inquiry, but this decision pertains to the orators. The seventh object of judgment is litigation of resident aliens, either between themselves or with citizens, and when this is settled a lovely species of justice shines forth in the commonwealth, when foreigners hear the voice of justice speaking against citizens in the courtroom. The final thing to fall under justice is a multitude of trivial contentions and contracts, which should not be scorned. For, just as a conflagration often breaks out if sparks are not extinguished, thus often does a shipwreck of the city occur if these petty squabbles are not decided. When Aristotle’s assumption has been set out, his conclusion follows, in which are explained the method of choosing the judge and the use of judgment. The method of election is either by all or by some, or by a certain mixed system from both, and this either by lot or by election, as I showed above concerning the magistrate. The utility is in the adaptation of all these things to the various forms of republics, for if the creation of judges is done by everybody, this pertains to democracy; if by some, to the power of the few; if in part by the former and in part by the latter, to the polity.
2. The interpretation of the text is clear. Now I come to the question, which it is whether judicial hearing should be given to trifling disputes between citizens. In describing the final object of the judge Aristotle requires this very thing. From this the interpreters gather that, in addition to high tribunals in which matters of great moment are handled, it is in the republic’s interest that certain petty courts be established, in which the litigations which daily arise between citizens can be tried. In the solution of this question is to be considered that in no part of the commonwealth should a window be open to injustice, injury, and the harm of the citizens. For this is requisite so that the voice of justice may be heard in every corner of the commonwealth, but without petty courts in which small matters may be handled, trifling squabbles take on strength and sometimes become intolerable. For, just as minor infirmities of the body are able to grow to the point that they destroy life, so the trifling controversies of citizens can erupt to the point that they entirely put out the light of the commonwealth. Wherefore, just as cures are to be appointed for the former, so courts are to be for the latter, in which litigating citizens may find judgment and peace. Furthermore, what equity, what proportion can exist in the commonwealth, if small issues and the suits of paupers are not ended by the voice of the judge? The court of justice lies open not just for Croesus but also for Irus, which surely cannot be if petty courts do not exist in which trifling contentions can be examined. Then too, that polity is not in all respects perfect in which the smallest wounds of injuries go unhealed. For, just as no body is healthy in which inhere the filaments of infirmity, so no republic is safe in which the embers of contention glow. So courts must be established in which cases of this kind may be heard. For otherwise, just as errors that go unrefuted often end in heresies, so quarrels not cut off sometimes turn into cruel tragedies. Finally, it is silly that all acts of litigation be handled before a high tribunal or in the senate. It is therefore expedient that other courts be approved by public authority, so that justice might be pronounced in the former by distinguished men, so in these it might be by middling or humble ones. Wherefore, even though it is to be hoped that citizens will not squabble between themselves about fleeting fortune’s shadow or about goat’s wool, yet since the fly has its bile and the pauper his spleen, under a flourishing constitution of the commonwealth it is needful that such tumors be soothed by the prudence of judges, as by a kind of medicine. For otherwise, as it were, men kindled by the torches of wrath will beget fevers and plagues in the commonwealth. Therefore everywhere in the commonwealth the least suits and controversies demand their court and their judge, and for the want and the abuse of these many a city and many a nation lie overwhelmed and buried in the ashes. For for what cause of greater evil exists other than the license of evil? And this surely waxes haughty when commonwealths live without judge and censure. Here I gladly pass over the faults of judgments and the blemishes of many a judge. Otherwise I could point my finger at many corruptions, false interpretations, delays, intolerable oppressions, and six hundred other courtroom monstrosities. But since these evils belong to men, not to any avarice of the laws or the commonwealth, I think they are best be kept concealed. Yet I pray great God that justice without error shine forth in judgments, equity without any blindness of the mind in judges.

THE DISTINCTION OF THE QUESTION

3. OBJECTION There are many other things that fall within the purview of judgment besides the eight enumerated here by the Philosopher, therefore he did not treat accurately of the things that fall within the purview of judgment. The antecedent is proven, since here there is no mention of crimes against God, none of theft, adultery, or the very many other wrongs committed against the citizen.
RESPONSE It is to be appreciated that here Aristotle is only treating of those evils which are designated as being committed against civil laws. But regarding all those things of which you complain that no mention is made, such as theft and adultery, I reply that these are comprehended under injury and loss (of which he does speak).
OPPOSITION Involuntary acts do not fall within the purview of justice, therefore the Philosopher made a bad distinction about involuntary wrongful acts falling within judicial purview. The antecedent is proven, since, according to the Philosopher in Book III of the Ethics, involuntary acts are not malfeasances.
RESPONSE Although in the Ethics Aristotle measures all actions, of the virtues and vices alike, according to will, there are nevertheless certain involuntary acts which fall within the purview of justice, and those that commit them are rightly haled before the court of the commonwealth. For example, once upon a time among the Athenian those who had returned from exile for involuntary homicide were placed on trial for murder, as Aristotle testifies here. The reason, as I think, was that the intention of the doer can in no way be better discussed and examined than by judgment.

OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE PROPOSED QUESTION

4. OBJECTION To treat by judgment the trivial and slight controversies of the people is to render the commonwealth contentious, therefore these most petty cases are not to be dealt with in judgment. The antecedent is proven, since small offenses arise everywhere and at all times, which it is quite silly to tax gravely in public judgment, and this also emboldens factious citizens in their pursuit of litigation.
RESPONSE In the courtroom, the judge looks not so much at cases as at the results of cases. Wherefore, even if cases are sometimes rather slight, in this matter an abundant caution of the commonwealth does no harm, lest grievous results follow upon their neglect, since he who does not wish the hemlock to sprout must dig up the hemlock’s root and seeds. Wisely said the poet, stop things in their beginnings.
OBJECTION Just as the common run of physicians often delays a cure to gain a greater fee, so do the common run of judges and courts in the commonwealth. Therefore it is preferable that both fewer judges and courts be maintained. Certainly experience teaches that there are the greatest factions in that republic where live a numerous tribe of jurists, since these gentlemen, enticed by the sweet smell of profit, hunt and grasp after mountains of gold, which certainly would not be possible if fewer men were admitted to the courtroom profession and the speaking platforms.
RESPONSE I respond in a word that this is a vice of the man, not the art. Physicians sometimes come flying to corpses like eagles, and jurists become vultures when they get their hands on gold. But these things neither destroy the arts as being vicious, nor argue that the common run of their practitioners are depraved. Yet I urge that the drones are to be kept from the hive lest they drink dry the cells, and that bad physicians and judges are to be restrained lest they destroy the commonwealth by their numbers.

THE CHAPTER’S DOUBTFUL QUESTION
Does involuntary manslaughter deserve the penalty for murder?

5. Inasmuch as nothing in the commonwealth is dearer than human life, God and nature command that utmost especial care be taken for it by the leading men of the commonwealth. Hence Aristotle, in speaking of the objects of judgments, distinguishes multiple forms of manslaughter (which is opposed to life), and lingers longer over its description than in the other things. And indeed what requires greater prudence of the magistrate than the just preservation of Man? What requires greater savagery of the judge than unust murder and the spilling of blood? The name of murder is hateful, by the force of which the noblest work of nature (which is Man) is broken asunder. Therefore nothing in the civil community ought to be scrutinized more severely than manslaughter, nothing should be punished more harshly than the murderer’s violent hand. Therefore the wise judge should always hold hematite in his right hand to staunch the blood of the innocent, but in his left a sword with which he may strike assassins and brutal murderers. Yet we must beware lest the sword become more powerful than the stone, that is, lest in avenging crime anger overwhelm mercy, since in capital cases sleeping Philip would not pronounce sentence. Therefore, as did Aristotle, manslaughter is to be distinguished, so that there is one kind which is voluntary, done by free will, another that is involuntary, done by accident, and yet another which is just and lawfully inflicted upon a man. The first is worthy of Phalaris’ bull and of the gallows, the second has ignorance as its excuse, the third is defended by law and reason. In this context the Philosopher disputes about the second kind, in which it is to be considered whether a legal or illegal thing is done when the crime is committed. For the former in a sense excuses the deed, but the latter aggravates a wicked crime. For example, should Caesar, casting a spear at a beast, chance to kill a man, this is not murder. But if he should idly toss a stone off his citadel and shed blood, this is called murder. For albeit in both cases there was no intent to kill, yet the cause is altered, since a permissible thing excuses the act, but an illegal one makes the crime all the more atrocious. Therefore involuntary manslaughter done by accident (if no evil intent either precedes or follows the deed) does not merit punishment for murder. But if evil intent precedes the act, or if pleasure in its accomplishment follows after at, the doer is guilty and should receive the punishment. I prove this by points. Will is the cause of crime, will is not the cause of involuntary manslaughter, therefore involuntary manslaughter is not a crime. Which being posited, the penalty for murder is not deserved. Furthermore, in involuntary manslaughter only accident presides and holds sway, therefore it is not a crime per se, for an accident is not intended by anybody acting for some particular purpose. This being granted, it is unjust to condemn under the title of murder a man who offends only by accident. Finally, who is punished for what he cannot avoid? But nobody can avoid any happenstance of fortune, therefore nobody needs to atone for a happenstance of fortune. Which being conceded, involuntary manslaughter, which is an act of fortune rather than the will, should not undergo the censure of the severe judge. Therefore if raging Alexander should kill Clytus, if drunken Antony should kill his bastard, if headstrong Lamech should kill Cain, then Alexander, Antony and Lamech are tyrants and murderers. But if that hunter Walter Tyrell should chance to strike Rufus his king, as is told in the chronicles of Britain, if in self defense Milo should strike Clodius, lying in wait for him, this is not murder. Therefore even if every manslaughter is to be closely scrutinized, since nothing is dearer than human life, yet not every perpetrator is to be condemned by sentence of death, since no crime is committed if no evil is conceived in the mind. For only the pregnant will lays and hatches the fertile eggs of felony.
6. OBJECTION More and weightier doubtful points in this treatise are raised by the commentators than the one presently under consideration, therefore a more capacious discussion needs to be opened. The antecedent is proven from example, for here it is asked by the commentators whether a man killing himself is a murderer. And again, whether a man incurs the guilt of murder when he kills another man in self defense. Then too, whether it should be permitted a condemned man to appeal the sentence of an unjust judge. Furthermore, whether men convicted of bearing false witness in a capital trial should pay the forfeit of the guilty. Finally, whether a woman can become a civil judge.
RESPONSE First I deny that these doubtful points are weightier than the one presently under discussion. Then I maintain that no mention or showing of these doubtful points is visible in the text. Finally I respond that the particular disputation of these things pertains to jurisprudence more than to this science, since here we are treating generally but not specifically about the elements of judgment, and not about the edicts and decrees of the commonwealth. Nevertheless I briefly maintain, in the first place, that the suicide is a murderer, since he voluntarily commits an evil with premeditation. In the second place, I say say that he who kills another in self defense is not a murderer. The reason is that such an act of violence is defended by the law of nature and the commonwealth. In the third place, I say that appeal from his judge is not permitted a condemned man, for thus the commonwealth and justice would suffer a shipwreck, and felonies would abound. In the fourth place, philosophers ordain that those convicted of bearing false witness in a capital case should be put to death, since a well-regulated commonwealth wholly abhors the unjust shedding of blood. Finally, I conclude as I did above, that the power of both governing and judging belongs to women, albeit there may exist a certain imperfection of their sex, yet not their mind, of their constitution, yet not their virtue. Observing decorum in its every action, the commonwealth prescribes that in actuality the judges performing this duty on the benches of justice should be spirited men rather than feeble women, not because it regards it as unbecoming for Judith to have presided over Israel, but because it thinks that such a burden of the republic should not be placed on women’s frail shoulders.

OBJECTIONS TO THE DOUBTFUL QUESTION

7. OBJECTION Believing himself to have killed a beast, Lamech killed a man, and yet he earned the penalty of murder, therefore involuntary manslaughter deserves the title and penalty of murder.
RESPONSE Interpreters respond either than this was done so that God might show how great a wrong it is to kill or man, or say that he suffer the penalty of the law because he took insufficient care in ascertaining whether he was striking a man or a beast.
OBJECTION A man accidentally killing a man sins, but in no other kind of wrong than murder, therefore he sins by murder. Which being granted, why should he not suffer the punishment for murder?
RESPONSE He sins against nature, since he destroys its most excellent being. Yet he does not sin mortally, since he does not voluntarily commit this malfeasance. Furthermore, there is another kind of sin in which he offends, for killing is not properly called murder.
OBJECTION If a women who has been beaten happens to miscarry, he who beat her is deemed a murder, and pays for soul with soul. Therefore involuntary manslaughter suffers the title and penalty of murder.
RESPONSE These things are true if the man who administered the beating was bent on something illegal. But if he was preoccupied with just and legal matters, this deed is rightly defined as accident and error, not murder.

PRAISE BE TO GOD

Go to Book V